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UncertaintyWe employ a panel quantile framework that quantifies the relative importance of quanti-
tative and qualitative factors across the conditional distribution of sovereign credit ratings
in the Eurozone area. We find that regulatory quality and competitiveness have a stronger
impact for low rated countries whereas GDP per capita is a major driver of high rated coun-
tries. A reduction in the current account deficit leads to a rating or outlook upgrade for low
rated countries. Economic policy uncertainty impacts negatively on credit ratings across
the conditional distribution; however, the impact is stronger for the lower rated countries.
In other words, the creditworthiness of low rated countries takes a much bigger ‘hit’ than
that of high rated countries when European policy uncertainty is on the rise.
 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
During the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 and the subsequent recession, Central Banks and governments responded
by injecting additional liquidity into the system and pursuing expansionary fiscal policies, respectively. With the world
economy in (the process of returning to) normality, fiscal positions are also being tightened up. Nevertheless, the significant
deterioration of public finances post 20071 has put on alert Credit Rating Agencies (hereafter CRAs). For instance, Moody’s
Investor Services, a major credit rating agency, has downgraded over the 2008–2013 period the debt rating of a number of
peripheral European countries, namely Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (hereafter the GIIPS) and Cyprus by 63 notches
in total.2 Similar decisions have been implemented by the other two main CRAs, namely Standard & Poor’s (S&P’s) and Fitch
Ratings, respectively.32007 to
.imf.org/
y’s.
_market_
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sense, they set the tone for gauging borrowing costs in international markets both for a sovereign state and the financial
institutions operating in that sovereign state (for recent evidence, see Drago and Gallo, 2017). This is vital for stimulating
investments and supporting economic growth.
Reputational concerns do discipline the decisions made by CRAs (see e.g. Bar-Isaac and Shapiro, 2013 and Mariano, 2012).
However, the value of reputation depends on economic fundamentals that vary over the business cycle. Using a theoretical
model of credit ratings with endogenous reputation, Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013) relate credit ratings decisions to the eco-
nomic cycle. They find that CRAs are more likely to issue less accurate ratings when fee-income is high, the economy is
booming and securities’ default probabilities are low. Indeed, during booms, hiring skilled analysts becomes more expensive
for CRAs. At the same time, CRAs can potentially charge higher fees and since bond issues are less likely to default, monitor-
ing a CRA activity becomes less effective.
Although the recent empirical literature has discussed a number of quantitative and qualitative factors affecting the deci-
sions of CRAs, an increasingly large number of decisions appear to remain unexplained. For instance, some of the down-
grades of peripheral European debt which took place in 2010 and beyond have been contested by the downgraded
peripheral countries and by prominent European policymakers. Speaking to the European parliament in May 2010, Jose Man-
uel Barroso, then the European Union Commission President, criticised the three main CRAs noting that ‘‘deficiencies in their
working methods has led to ratings being too cyclical, too reliant on the general market mood rather than on fundamentals-
regardless of whether market mood is too optimistic or too pessimistic” (Barroso, 2010).
In a letter published in March 2011 by The Economist, David Beers (2011), Standard & Poor’s (at that time) Global head of
sovereign ratings, defended the record of the CRAs. He noted that credit ratings ‘‘provide a robust ranking of the risk of sover-
eign default” and ‘‘are independent opinions of creditworthiness based on fundamental analysis and therefore should be
expected to change as credit risk evolves over the cycle”. Gärtner and Griesbach (2012) argued that ‘‘sovereign ratings, their
meaning and their underlying procedures are rather opaque”. They also went on to argue that ‘‘the set of relevant fundamen-
tal variables is an open one, and the interpretation of ever evolving political institutions and processes in unprecedented
environments are a dime a dozen”. Moritz Kraemer, Global Chief Rating Officer of Standard & Poor’s, dismissed the argu-
ments of Gärtner and Griesbach (2012) as ‘‘simply wrong” and went on to note that S&P’s sovereign rating decisions are
accompanied by comprehensive published rationales and, often, press releases that explain their reasoning and approach.
Kraemer (2012) also pointed out that S&P’s explain on their website how they arrive at their ratings and how their ratings
perform over time (see www.understandingratings.com) which makes their publications as transparent and complete as
possible.
The growing dissatisfaction across Europe about some of the recent credit rating decisions, has given rise to talks among
Eurozone member states about setting up a European credit rating agency which will increase competition in the rating busi-
ness. Nevertheless, the European Central Bank (ECB) has been very cautious about how quickly such a project could be
deployed. In February 2011, the ECB pointed out that a new credit rating agency will have to rely on extensive data, a number
of models, experienced staff and go through building a sound track record for several years before it establishes itself as a
credible agency in the rating business (Tait, 2011). In 2016, European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), which is
the authority competent for the supervision of CRAs, published a report on sovereign ratings processes which noted that
because of a ‘‘switch to a regulated industry with focus on integrity of process . . . ESMA has driven significant changes in
the credit rating process and the methodology . . . thereby strengthening their integrity, independence, quality and trans-
parency” (ESMA, 2016 Report, p. 16).
This paper attempts a comprehensive assessment of credit rating decisions made by the three main CRAs for the Eurozone
economies in light of the ongoing criticism discussed above. The existing literature on the determinants of sovereign credit
ratings has focussed on several macroeconomic, qualitative and risk factors. Recent studies focus on time-varying models of
credit ratings (Reusens and Croux, 2017) and models with debt levels conditional on debt being above or below endoge-
nously determined debt threshold levels (Hmiden and Cheikh, 2016). Prior to this, Afonso et al. (2011) examine differenti-
ations across rating levels by splitting their dataset into two groups according to the ratings level, namely high-rated
countries with credit grades BBB+ and above and low rated countries with credit grades BBB and below.
Arguably, however, the actual degree of importance of the different explanatory variables across the conditional distri-
bution of sovereign credit rating has not been explored in detail as most of the studies focus on the average responses.
We fill the gap in the literature by implementing panel quantile estimation with nonadditive fixed effects as proposed by
Powell (2016). Our contribution to the existing literature is summarised as follows: First, we employ a panel quantile frame-
work that allows us to observe the relative importance of quantitative and qualitative factors across the conditional distri-
bution of sovereign credit ratings rather than merely focussing on their conditional mean. Second, we augment the
information set considered in previous studies by examining and identifying the significant impact of competitiveness
and the European economic policy uncertainty index on the Eurozone sovereign credit ratings.
Among our findings, the unemployment rate, regulatory quality and competitiveness have a stronger impact for low rated
countries whereas GDP per capita is a major driver of high rated countries. A reduction in the current account deficit or an
increase in the current account surplus leads to a rating or outlook upgrade for low rated countries. Economic policy uncer-
tainty impacts negatively on credit ratings across the conditional distribution; however, the impact is stronger on the lower
rated countries. We quantify the effects of uncertainty on credit ratings by using estimates of our model under uncertainty to
infer what credit ratings would have been had uncertainty remained at its pre-financial and pre-European debt crisis average
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the height of the Eurozone crisis in 2011 and in 2012; the impact of uncertainty has been substantial but somewhat less
severe for the remaining GIIPS and Cyprus. In other words, our empirical analysis suggests a pivotal role that economic policy
uncertainty in the Euro area has played in downgrading the credit profile of Eurozone’s periphery.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the data. Section 3 introduces the model and Section 4 pre-
sents the empirical estimates. Section 5 provides a discussion of our findings and offers some policy implications. Finally,
Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.2. Data
We use annual data from 2002 to 2015 for nineteen Eurozone countries (266 observations in total). Our dependent vari-
able is the sovereign credit rating published by the three main international rating agencies, Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s
(S&P’s) and Fitch Ratings (attributed at the end of each calendar year). A linear transformation of credit ratings to numerical
scale is implemented starting from 21 for the highest quality with a stable outlook (AAA for Fitch and S&P’s and Aaa for Moo-
dy’s) and ending to 1 for Default (D for Fitch and S&P’s and C for Moody’s). The difference between two continuous ratings
with the same outlook is always equal to 1. Not only we account for changes in credit ratings, but we also consider changes
in credit outlooks.4 The difference between two continuous outlooks is always equal to 1/3, so the difference between two con-
tinuous ratings with the same outlook is always equal to one. Table 1 reports the linear transformation of credit ratings and
provides details on the frequencies of the ratings per category.
We start by adopting a standard set of explanatory variables previously used in the literature (see e.g. Reusens and Croux,
2017; Dimitrakopoulos and Kolossiatis, 2016; Aizenman et al., 2013 and Afonso et al., 2011), namely GDP per capita, Govern-
ment Debt, Current Account Balance, Inflation Rate, Unemployment Rate and Regulatory Quality Index. The expected impact
of each explanatory variable on credit ratings is as follows:
1. GDP per capita – positive response: Higher GDP per capita coincides with a larger tax base and, therefore, an increased
ability of the government to repay its obligations. This variable can also reflect the degree of economic development.
2. Government debt – negative response: A high stock of government debt implies higher interest rates to accommodate it.
Therefore, additional financial resources are needed to repay debt obligations. A higher government debt can increase the
risk of default.
3. Current account balance – uncertain response: On the one hand, a higher current account deficit can signal overconsump-
tion, undermining prosperity in the long run. On the other hand, it might have a positive effect, taking into account the
productivity of the additional investments and their potentially positive economic impact in the short run.
4. Inflation rate – uncertain response: Higher inflation rates are a sign of structural and macroeconomic imbalances in the
government’s finances. On the other hand, very low inflation might lead to a deflationary spiral (Reusens and Croux,
2017). If we were dealing with debt in domestic currency, high inflation reduces the real stock of government debt in
domestic currency and partially offsets the negative impact of high inflation.
5. Unemployment rate – negative response: A country with lower unemployment has an efficient labour market. The lower
is the unemployment, the greater is overall taxable income and the lower the fiscal burden for unemployment subsidies.
6. Regulatory quality – positive response: Our Regulatory quality index is a combination of several individual variables such
as investment and financial freedom, business regulatory environment, competition policy, tax inconsistency, financial
institution’s transparency, public sector openness to foreign bidders and easiness to start new business.5 A high value
of regulatory quality index reflects the ability of the government to implement necessary regulations that can boost private
sector development and increase investment and GDP. Moreover it can be a qualitative quantification of the government’s
willingness to repay its obligations. Fig. 1 plots the regulatory quality index which shows a fair amount of cross-sectional
variation; we note that Greece and Slovenia lag behind the remaining countries for most of the sample whereas Finland,
Ireland, Luxemburg and The Netherlands are at the top of the list at the end of our sample.
We further augment our information set by considering two additional explanatory variables. The first one is the
Competitiveness Indicator; an increase in the index implies lower competitiveness which can affect negatively on the credit
rating decisions.6 Indeed, lack of competitiveness impacts negatively on a country’s ability to attract private investments in an
international environment. Weak competiveness is often highlighted by government authorities and international organizations
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Commission (EC) and the European Central Bank (ECB) as one of
the main drawbacks of Eurozone’s periphery relative to Eurozone’s core. Fig. 2 plots the competitiveness measure which shows4 We do not account for watch positive and watch negative outlooks for two reasons. First, we assume that the positive (negative) outlook is conceptually
very close to watch positive (watch negative) outlook and, second, the number of watch positive and watch negative observations in our dataset is very small
and equal to 10 for Fitch and 15 for S&P’s. Treating watches as outlooks makes no qualitative difference to the main results of our paper reported below (in
Tables 2–4).
5 See: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/rq.pdf.
6 This is the harmonised competitiveness indicator based on unit labour costs indices for the total economy; available from: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/
stats/ecb_statistics/escb/html/table.en.html?id=JDF_EXR_HCI_ULCT&period=index.
Table 1
Linear transformation of sovereign ratings.
Rating Agency Frequency Rating Grades
Fitch S&P’s Moody’s Outlook Fitch S&P’s Moody’s (1 2 1)
Highest quality AAA AAA Aaa Stable 90 75 86 21
Negative 4 10 9 20.67
Positive – 1 – 20.33
AA+ AA+ Aa1 Stable 9 15 9 20
Negative 1 4 5 19.67
Positive – – 3 19.33
High quality AA AA Aa2 Stable 20 10 19 19
Negative 8 10 1 18.67
Positive 2 – 3 18.33
AA- AA- Aa3 Stable 5 11 6 18
Negative 6 4 3 17.67
Positive 5 1 5 17.33
A+ A+ A1 Stable 21 13 25 17
Negative 3 3 4 16.67
Positive 9 5 4 16.33
Strong payment capacity A A A2 Stable 14 29 14 16
Negative 1 8 5 15.67
Positive 5 2 4 15.33
A- A- A3 Stable 9 12 11 15
Negative 3 3 3 14.67
Positive 2 4 2 14.33
BBB+ BBB+ Baa1 Stable 10 6 7 14
Negative 7 4 2 13.67
Adequate payment capacity Positive 4 4 3 13.33
BBB BBB Baa2 Stable 5 5 2 13
Negative 3 4 3 12.67
Positive 1 – 2 12.33
BBB- BBB- Baa3 Stable 1 3 3 12
Negative 2 3 3 11.67
Positive – 1 – 11.33
BB+ BB+ Ba1 Stable 3 2 5 11
Negative 4 1 3 10.67
Likely to fullfill obligations, ongoing uncertainty Positive – – – 10.33
BB BB Ba2 Stable – 1 – 10
Negative – 3 1 9.67
Positive – 1 – 9.33
BB- BB- Ba3 Stable – – 1 9
Negative 1 – 1 8.67
Positive – – – 8.33
B+ B+ B1 Stable 1 1 1 8
Negative – – – 7.67
Positive – – – 7.33
High credit risk B B B2 Stable 1 1 – 7
Negative – – – 6.67
Positive 1 – – 6.33
B- B- B3 Stable 1 3 1 6
Negative 1 – 1 5.67
Positive – – – 5.33
CCC+ CCC+ Caa1 Stable – 1 1 5
Negative – 1 – 4.67
Positive – – – 4.33
Very high credit risk CCC CCC Caa2 Stable 4 – – 4
Negative – – – 3.67
Positive – – – 3.33
CCC- CCC- Caa3 Stable – – 2 3
Negative – – 1 2.66
Non default wih possibility of recovery Default CC CC Ca – – – 2.33
C – 2 1 2
DDD SD C
DD D – – 1 1
D
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the rest of the countries (Ireland caught up with Germany at the end of the sample).
Fig. 1. Regulatory quality index for the Eurozone countries.
Fig. 2. Competitiveness indicator for the Eurozone countries. Notes: Competitiveness indicator 1999 = 100.
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erally on the behaviour of rating agencies over time and more specifically on the cumulative downgrades of periphery’s
bonds during the recent Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. The index is constructed based on newspaper articles regarding pol-
icy uncertainty from 10 leading European newspapers. It counts the number of newspaper articles containing the terms
uncertain or uncertainty, economic or economy, and one or more policy-relevant terms; for more information see Baker
et al. (2016) and http://www.policyuncertainty.com/index.html. European policy uncertainty is expected to exert a negative
impact on credit ratings. This is because higher uncertainty worsens the economic environment, makes consumers and
investors more cautious and reduces future consumption and investment. Appendix Table A.1 provides details on our data
definitions and sources of the dataset discussed here as well as details of all other variables used in the robustness Section 4.3
of the paper. Appendix Table A.2 provides the summary statistics for our dataset.
The main empirical results of the paper (reported in Section 4.1 below) rely on the eight control variables reported above.
Our sample covers both the pre-crisis and the post-crisis period. Pre-crisis as well as post-crisis, monetary policy has been
playing an important and further increasing role for the credit ratings of the euro area member states. Pre-crisis the ratings of
the later crisis-affected countries might have been strongly biased upwards by low-cost credit provision linked to substantial
ECB interest rate cuts in response to the post-2000 stock market slump.7 In some countries, fast growing government expen-
diture has boosted unsustainable credit growth, which dramatically raised tax revenues. In the long run, the latter became a
major reason for the crisis. Post-crisis, the increasingly loose monetary policy stance of the ECB aimed at stabilising the eco-
nomic performance of the crisis-affected countries while, at the same time, fiscal tightening has put a drag on economic recov-
ery. We take a closer look at some of these issues in Section 4.2 of the paper. But before doing so, we outline, in Section 3, our
methodology.
3. Methodology
Quantile regression is appropriate when the variables of interest have varying effects at different points of the conditional
distribution of the outcome variable. There has been a growing literature that combines quantile estimation with panel data.
In mean regression, panel data allow for the inclusion of fixed effects to capture within group variation. Many quantile panel
data estimators use an analogous method and include additive fixed effects. However, the additive fixed effects change the
underlying model. We implement the quantile regression estimator for panel data (QRPD) with nonadditive fixed effects
introduced by Powell (2016).
The main advantage of this method relative to the existing quantile estimators with additive fixed effects (ai) is that it
provides estimates of the distribution of Yit given Dit instead of Yit – ai given Dit.8
Powell (2016) notes that in many empirical applications the latter is undesirable. This is because observations at the top
of the (Yit  ai) distribution may be at the bottom of the Yit distribution and therefore additive fixed effect models cannot
provide information about the effects of the policy variables on the outcome distribution. Thus, Powell’s (2016) method pro-
vides point estimates which can be interpreted in the same way as the ones coming from cross-sectional regression. It is also
consistent for small T. The underlying model is:7 For
8 Tha
ai þ d0 b
that theYit ¼
X8
j¼1
D0itbjðUitÞ; ð1Þwhere Yit is the sovereign credit rating for each CRA, bj is the parameter of interest, Dit is the set of explanatory variables and
Uit is the error term that may be a function of several disturbance terms, some fixed and some time-varying. The model is
linear in parameters and D0itbðsÞ is strictly increasing in s. In general, for the sth quantile of Yit , quantile regression relies on
the conditional restriction:PðYit 6 D0itbðsÞ Dit
 Þ ¼ s ð2ÞEq. (2) states that the probability the outcome variable is smaller than the quantile function is the same for all Dit and equal
to s. Powell’s (2016) QRPD estimator allows this probability to vary by individual and even within-individual as long as such
variation is orthogonal to the instruments. Thus, QRPD relies on a conditional restriction and an unconditional restriction,
letting Di ¼ ðDi1; . . . ;DiTÞ:PðYit 6 D0itbðsÞ Di
 Þ ¼ PðYis 6 D0isbðsÞ Di Þ;
PðYit 6 D0itbðsÞÞ ¼ s
ð3Þinstance, the discount rate for the Euro area fell from 5.75% in late 2000 to 3% in late 2005.
t is due to the different structural quantile functions (SQF). The SQF of QRPD is d0bðsÞ. In contrast, the SQF of models using additive fixed effects is
ðsÞ where d denotes potential values of Dit and s is the relevant quantile of Yit. The notation bðsÞ for the additive fixed effect model is used to highlight
se parameters are different than those used in the nonadditive fixed effects model.
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that if the explanatory variables are exogenous (in which case Di ¼ Zi) many of the identification conditions are met trivially.
Estimation uses Generalized Method of Moments. Sample moments are defined as:9 All
site/dav
10 Qua
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11 Mo
one. Th
Cyprusg^ðbÞ ¼ 1
N
XN
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giðbÞ with giðbÞ ¼
1
T
XT
i¼1
ðZit  ZiÞ½1ðYit 6 D0itbÞ
( )
; ð4Þwhere Zi ¼ 1T
PT
i¼1Zit .
Using (3), the parameter set is defined as:B  b s 1
N
 6 1N
XN
i¼1
1ðYit 6 D0itbÞ 6 s
( )
for all t: ð5ÞThen, the parameter of interest is estimated asb^ðsÞ ¼ argmin
b2b
g^0ðbÞA^g^ðbÞ ð6Þfor some weighting matrix A^. The model is estimated using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) optimization method.94. Empirical results
4.1. Main estimates
We capture the varying effects on credit ratings by estimating the model for the 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, . . ., 0.75 quantiles for
each of the three CRAs (the model also estimates time fixed effects). Appendix Figs. A1–A3 map the sovereign credit ratings
to the quantile distribution for the three CRAs. Almost 25% of the observations are in the highest quality AAA. That is the
reason why 0.75 is the highest quantile we employ in this paper. Table A.3 provides information on the countries considered
in each quantile per year; these should be read together with Table 1.10
To deal with the small sample bias, we report throughout the paper bootstrapped p-values based on 1000 replications and
discuss (in Section 4.3) a large number of robustness checks that we feel go some way towards supporting our main results
reported in this section of the paper.
In order to control for potential endogeneity (credit ratings can for instance have an impact on current account positions
or government debt levels) we re-run the same model treating all explanatory variables as endogenous and using first-order
lags as instruments. Estimated results (reported in appendix Tables A.4–A.6) are similar to those reported below.
Tables 2–4 report estimated coefficients, associated bootstrapped p-values, the pseudo-R2 and the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) for each quantile and each CRA. All explanatory variables have the expected signs and are statistically signif-
icant at almost all quantiles. The impact of the unemployment rate, regulatory quality and competitiveness is stronger at low
ratings. For instance, the coefficient of the unemployment rate reduces from 0.4446 at the 0.05 quantile to 0.2201 at the
0.35 quantile and then to0.0069 at the 0.75 quantile for Fitch. The estimates for Moody’s and S&P’s follow a similar pattern.
Based on the quantile distribution, the impact of an improvement in regulatory quality on credit ratings is almost two times
higher for counties rated at A1 and below for Moody’s than those rated at Aa3 and almost 8 times higher than those rated at
Aa1 or Aaa. Additionally, ceteris paribus, an annual decrease in the cost competiveness index by seven points of the index
(such a move is not unusual in our dataset) brings about one half (7⁄0.0687) of a notch upgrade at the 0.05 quantile for
S&P’s, one quarter (7⁄0.0324) of a notch upgrade at the 0.35 and only 0.05 (7⁄0.0061) of a notch upgrade at the 0.75
quantile. The impact of government debt on credit ratings is almost equally important for countries rated at adequate pay-
ment capacity and below and for those rated at high and highest quality, but impressively enough, is less strong for countries
rated at strong payment capacity (that is, A1, A2, and A3 ratings for Moody’s, and A+, A, and A- ratings for S&P’s and Fitch) for
all three CRAs. For example, the coefficient of Government Debt for S&P’s is 0.0398 at the 0.15 quantile, 0.0370 at the 0.70
quantile but only 0.0209 and 0.0069 at the 0.45 and 0.50 quantiles, respectively.
CRAs attribute a higher weight on GDP per capita11 for high rated countries; the impact of GDP per capita on sovereign
credit rating is almost five times higher for the 0.65 quantile relative to the 0.15 one and almost two times higher relative
to the 0.30 and 0.35 quantiles for Fitch. Therefore, the high level of GDP per capita provides a ‘safety net’ protecting (to some
extent) from downgrades in the case of high rated countries.estimations are done in STATA using David Powell’s quantile estimator with nonadditive fixed effects available at: https://sites.google.com/
idmatthewpowell/quantile-regression-with-nonadditive-fixed-effects.
ntile coefficients tell us the effects on distributions and not on individuals (see e.g. Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Quantile regression estimates require
rogramming methods, are more robust to outliers compared to OLS and avoid assumptions about the parametric distribution of the error process.
ody’s GDP per capita coefficients at the 0.05 and 0.10 part of the distribution are counter-intuitive as is the S&P’s GDP per capita coefficient at the 0.05
is, however, does not apply to Fitch. One possibility for this result is that countries at this very low part of the distribution, mainly Greece after 2010 and
after 2012, have witnessed persistent recession in the second half of the sample.
Table 2
Estimates for Moody’s, 2002–2015.
Log GDP per
capita
Government Debt Current Account Inflation Rate Unemployment
Rate
Regulatory
Quality
Competitiveness Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
Dependent Variable: Moody’s rating
0.05 1.1960 0.000 0.0264 0.000 0.1159 0.000 0.2609 0.000 0.3202 0.000 4.3321 0.000 0.0467 0.000 0.0325 0.000 9.207 0.585
0.10 0.6623 0.000 0.0384 0.000 0.0604 0.000 0.0332 0.000 0.3341 0.000 4.3158 0.000 0.0360 0.000 0.0158 0.000 9.072 0.594
0.15 0.6975 0.000 0.0370 0.000 0.0077 0.000 0.0027 0.000 0.2744 0.000 4.1139 0.000 0.0349 0.000 0.0119 0.000 8.804 0.608
0.20 3.1277 0.000 0.0387 0.000 0.0508 0.000 0.0034 0.864 0.2400 0.000 4.1229 0.000 0.0313 0.000 0.0117 0.000 8.049 0.627
0.25 4.6216 0.000 0.0449 0.000 0.0196 0.014 0.0680 0.000 0.1907 0.000 3.3931 0.000 0.0329 0.000 0.0175 0.000 7.426 0.639
0.30 5.4820 0.000 0.0372 0.000 0.0377 0.000 0.0410 0.203 0.1181 0.000 4.1231 0.000 0.0341 0.000 0.0109 0.000 7.528 0.625
0.35 4.8628 0.000 0.0412 0.000 0.1542 0.011 0.1530 0.024 0.1286 0.000 3.2106 0.000 0.0251 0.000 0.0307 0.000 7.345 0.575
0.40 3.3678 0.000 0.0082 0.000 0.0739 0.001 0.0221 0.576 0.2136 0.000 4.4561 0.000 0.0484 0.000 0.0136 0.000 7.884 0.584
0.45 4.3645 0.000 0.0089 0.153 0.0789 0.000 0.0111 0.694 0.2083 0.000 4.0718 0.000 0.0294 0.000 0.0191 0.000 7.092 0.533
0.50 3.7006 0.000 0.0032 0.337 0.0226 0.000 0.1233 0.000 0.2119 0.000 2.4526 0.000 0.0156 0.000 0.0140 0.000 7.505 0.554
0.55 4.4081 0.000 0.0097 0.000 0.0050 0.029 0.0834 0.000 0.2319 0.000 1.6651 0.000 0.0325 0.000 0.0158 0.000 7.621 0.589
0.60 6.7502 0.000 0.0272 0.000 0.0347 0.056 0.0363 0.213 0.2010 0.000 1.9421 0.000 0.0263 0.000 0.0062 0.001 8.069 0.627
0.65 6.9493 0.000 0.0168 0.000 0.0641 0.000 0.2221 0.000 0.2727 0.000 0.6950 0.000 0.0036 0.656 0.0091 0.070 8.414 0.519
0.70 8.4967 0.000 0.0246 0.000 0.0411 0.000 0.1600 0.000 0.0403 0.163 0.9713 0.001 0.0100 0.000 0.0042 0.000 8.736 0.519
0.75 9.7634 0.000 0.0308 0.000 0.0263 0.025 0.1112 0.011 0.0133 0.629 0.3437 0.180 0.0201 0.000 0.0076 0.002 8.889 0.495
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
Table 3
Estimates for S&P’s, 2002–2015.
Log GDP per
capita
Government Debt Current Account Inflation Rate Unemployment
Rate
Regulatory
Quality
Competitiveness Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
Dependent Variable: S&P’s rating
0.05 0.1961 0.000 0.0277 0.000 0.0565 0.000 0.0361 0.000 0.3655 0.000 5.0575 0.000 0.0687 0.000 0.0219 0.000 9.101 0.620
0.10 2.7722 0.000 0.0316 0.000 0.0156 0.000 0.0336 0.000 0.2247 0.000 3.3226 0.000 0.0539 0.000 0.0112 0.000 8.414 0.663
0.15 4.1889 0.000 0.0398 0.000 0.0424 0.000 0.1598 0.000 0.2510 0.000 1.8446 0.000 0.0417 0.000 0.0118 0.000 8.019 0.681
0.20 4.8046 0.000 0.0293 0.000 0.0194 0.049 0.1416 0.000 0.2487 0.000 2.7552 0.000 0.0328 0.000 0.0206 0.000 7.397 0.684
0.25 3.2558 0.000 0.0237 0.000 0.0540 0.000 0.1174 0.000 0.2821 0.000 2.6147 0.000 0.0420 0.000 0.0159 0.000 8.292 0.675
0.30 4.5407 0.000 0.0277 0.000 0.0555 0.000 0.0873 0.000 0.2470 0.000 2.4303 0.000 0.0439 0.000 0.0109 0.000 7.616 0.682
0.35 5.6193 0.000 0.0402 0.000 0.0202 0.035 0.2705 0.000 0.2713 0.000 2.3127 0.000 0.0324 0.000 0.0151 0.000 6.908 0.683
0.40 6.2628 0.000 0.0270 0.000 0.0083 0.303 0.1976 0.000 0.2361 0.000 1.7445 0.000 0.0275 0.000 0.0129 0.000 7.490 0.687
0.45 6.5806 0.000 0.0209 0.000 0.0130 0.003 0.1212 0.000 0.2405 0.000 1.3283 0.000 0.0275 0.000 0.0066 0.000 7.834 0.670
0.50 5.4772 0.000 0.0069 0.046 0.0419 0.308 0.1020 0.000 0.2703 0.000 1.0692 0.000 0.0041 0.169 0.0153 0.000 7.345 0.636
0.55 8.1589 0.000 0.0373 0.000 0.0568 0.029 0.0810 0.000 0.2010 0.000 1.6103 0.000 0.0191 0.000 0.0007 0.810 8.576 0.671
0.60 8.3574 0.000 0.0200 0.000 0.0129 0.315 0.0264 0.686 0.1562 0.000 0.4308 0.072 0.0118 0.000 0.0109 0.000 8.727 0.645
0.65 8.8327 0.000 0.0211 0.000 0.0524 0.001 0.3271 0.000 0.2436 0.000 1.1058 0.000 0.0036 0.360 0.0137 0.000 8.896 0.567
0.70 11.1976 0.000 0.0370 0.000 0.0311 0.007 0.0352 0.245 0.0564 0.000 0.2596 0.417 0.0009 0.460 0.0085 0.000 9.133 0.619
0.75 12.6666 0.000 0.0429 0.000 0.0292 0.105 0.0962 0.005 0.0169 0.359 0.1282 0.343 0.0061 0.009 0.0064 0.089 9.316 0.591
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
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Table 4
Estimates for Fitch, 2002–2015.
Log GDP per
capita
Government Debt Current Account Inflation Rate Unemployment
Rate
Regulatory
Quality
Competitiveness Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
Dependent Variable: Fitch rating
0.05 0.8393 0.000 0.0237 0.000 0.0960 0.000 0.0463 0.000 0.4446 0.000 1.2453 0.000 0.0509 0.000 0.0317 0.000 9.116 0.577
0.10 0.7370 0.000 0.0179 0.000 0.0765 0.000 0.1005 0.000 0.4457 0.000 2.8360 0.000 0.0389 0.000 0.0115 0.000 8.911 0.633
0.15 2.3524 0.000 0.0253 0.000 0.0583 0.000 0.1070 0.000 0.4223 0.000 2.7182 0.000 0.0419 0.000 0.0053 0.000 8.563 0.651
0.20 3.4014 0.000 0.0203 0.000 0.0433 0.000 0.1092 0.000 0.3287 0.000 2.6176 0.000 0.0421 0.000 0.0107 0.000 8.214 0.663
0.25 6.5064 0.000 0.0294 0.000 0.0045 0.442 0.1364 0.000 0.3004 0.000 1.6866 0.000 0.0488 0.000 0.0093 0.000 7.198 0.669
0.30 4.7267 0.000 0.0554 0.000 0.0523 0.019 0.2287 0.000 0.3111 0.000 1.3404 0.000 0.0381 0.000 0.0040 0.441 7.729 0.634
0.35 5.6993 0.000 0.0074 0.000 0.0179 0.006 0.0578 0.000 0.2201 0.000 2.2305 0.000 0.0370 0.000 0.0118 0.000 7.267 0.635
0.40 6.5795 0.000 0.0120 0.000 0.0386 0.000 0.1348 0.000 0.1908 0.000 2.3079 0.000 0.0388 0.000 0.0152 0.000 7.794 0.633
0.45 6.1085 0.000 0.0122 0.000 0.0202 0.000 0.0288 0.035 0.2246 0.000 2.7174 0.000 0.0402 0.000 0.0098 0.000 7.632 0.647
0.50 5.4025 0.000 0.0128 0.000 0.0241 0.144 0.1071 0.000 0.2603 0.000 2.5984 0.000 0.0315 0.000 0.0049 0.201 7.495 0.630
0.55 5.2451 0.000 0.0092 0.001 0.0082 0.309 0.0148 0.259 0.2261 0.000 2.3528 0.000 0.0221 0.000 0.0077 0.000 7.297 0.660
0.60 9.3137 0.000 0.0249 0.000 0.0217 0.000 0.0429 0.000 0.1646 0.000 0.1749 0.006 0.0177 0.000 0.0010 0.097 8.789 0.632
0.65 10.1534 0.000 0.0262 0.000 0.0306 0.000 0.0698 0.000 0.1308 0.000 0.6065 0.000 0.0091 0.000 0.0009 0.667 9.021 0.616
0.70 9.1753 0.000 0.0292 0.000 0.0575 0.000 0.1863 0.000 0.0706 0.000 0.8319 0.000 0.0133 0.000 0.0006 0.832 8.843 0.595
0.75 11.8393 0.000 0.0379 0.000 0.0449 0.000 0.1528 0.000 0.0069 0.193 0.7012 0.000 0.0181 0.000 0.0025 0.132 9.182 0.498
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
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48 P. Boumparis et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 79 (2017) 39–71The significance of inflation rate varies across the rating distribution but without any specific trend pattern. Economic
policy uncertainty impacts negatively on credit ratings across the quantile distribution and the impact is stronger on the
lower rated countries; in other words, when European uncertainty kicks in, low rated countries take a much bigger ‘hit’ than
high rated countries. Further, the uncertainty effect is stronger for Moody’s and weaker for Fitch at all quantiles.
The impact of the current account balance is positive at the 0.05, 0.10 and 0.15 quantiles for all agencies and remains
positive at the 0.20, 0.25, and 0.30 quantiles for S&P’s and at the 0.20 and 0.30 quantiles for Fitch. The impact of the current
account turns negative at all other quantiles for all CRAs. Hence, we find an asymmetric impact of the current account over
the quantile distribution of sovereign ratings. Noting that the impact of current account balance on sovereign credit ratings is
theoretically uncertain, our analysis shows that a reduction in the current account deficit or an increase in the current
account surplus leads to a rating or outlook upgrade for low rated countries which have historically recorded high current
account deficits.12 The effect is entirely different for countries with strong payment capacity, high and highest quality. In this
case, a higher current account deficit or a lower current account surplus is associated with either higher creditworthiness or
positive economic prospects of the economy and consequently a higher sovereign rating (Afonso et al., 2011). But why low rated
countries (namely the GIIPS and Cyprus) are downgraded when they record higher current account deficits? Recalling that cur-
rent account deficits reflect net borrowing from abroad, one might argue that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with current
account imbalances if countries borrow from abroad to invest in capacity which consequently allows them to satisfy their debt
obligations. Rather than doing this, Eurozone’s periphery funds from abroad largely ended up in non-traded sectors (like gov-
ernment consumption and housing); see, for instance, the discussion in Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015).13
In the preliminary analysis we added the growth rate of GDP as an extra explanatory variable but found very weak evi-
dence of a positive and statistically significant impact on credit ratings; this might have to do with the persistently weak GDP
growth rates observed in the Euro area over the recent years. Arguably, however, the impact of GDP growth on credit ratings
is indirectly captured by the impact of the unemployment rate through an Okun’s-law type of approximation (in which case
there is an inverse relationship between unemployment and GDP growth).4.2. Incorporating the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy
Fiscal discipline has been on the agenda of policymakers in the Euro area after 2009. Fiscal balance to-GDP-ratio was not a
major concern for CRAs in making credit rating decisions for developed countries until the recent Eurozone debt crisis;
Reusens and Croux (2017) identify a significant positive effect from the fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio on credit ratings only
after 2009. In our case, we could only find some statistical evidence using the lagged fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio as an
explanatory variable. Arguably, such a finding has to do with continuous revisions in the fiscal balance variable as well as
the disagreement between authorities not only on the predicted fiscal balance but also on the actual outcome14,15; to this
end, we mention the study of De Castro et al. (2013) who find that most preliminary European Union government balance data
releases ‘‘are biased and non efficient predictors of subsequent releases, with later vintages of data tending to show lower bud-
get balances than indicated by earlier data releases on average” (De Castro et al., 2013, page 1207). In light of this, CRAs might
have been reluctant to monitor current fiscal balance for credit rating decisions which, in turn, might explain why lagged fiscal
balance might play more of a role.16
That said, pre-crisis government budget balances and thereby government debt did not indicate growing risk in GIIPS and
Cyprus. The reason is that the unsustainable speculation booms due to low-cost credit provision linked to substantial ECB
interest rate cuts in response to the post-2000 stock market slump created windfall tax revenues, which made budget bal-
ances and government debt look sound. This, rather than the statistical revisions mentioned above, could explain why the
fiscal balance-to-GDP ratios (i.e. the Maastricht criterion) are not related to credit ratings (see Schnabl and Wollmershäuser,
2013). With this in mind, we added government expenditure in our model as an additional explanatory variable, with grow-
ing expenditure being linked to higher risk. To identify the full impact of government debt on ratings, the impact of uncon-
ventional monetary policy on government bond yields has to be controlled for. Therefore, we re-run the models reported in
Tables 2–4 using the general government expenditure-to-GDP ratio and a measure of unconventional monetary policy as
additional regressors. To capture unconventional monetary policy effects we use (a) the ECB purchases and holdings of secu-
rities for monetary policy purposes as a percentage of Eurozone GDP (see the discussion in Lo Duca et al., 2016) and, alter-
natively, (b) the ECB total balance sheet assets as a percentage of GDP; expansion of the latter is often quoted by the financial12 Over 2002–2015, Greece recorded an average current account deficit of 7.61% as a share of its GDP. The corresponding deficit figures for Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, Spain and Cyprus were 0.85%, 0.87%, 6.63%, 4.02% and 6.45%. By contrast, the Euro area recorded an average current account surplus of 0.71% as a
share of its GDP.
13 The correlation between the current account variable and the competitiveness indicator is only -0.28 which eases any multicollinearity concerns. In any
case, we have re-estimated the models in Tables 2–4 by dropping competitiveness. This made no qualitative difference to the estimates on the remaining
variables (including the current account). Dropping the current account variable made no difference to the empirical estimates on the remaining variables
(including competitiveness).
14 See, for instance: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-deficits-idUSTRE63L1G420100422.
15 See: http://ec.europa.eu/info/files/winter-2017-economic-forecast-greece_en.
16 Our results (available on request) suggest that there is a positive effect of the lagged fiscal balance throughout the distribution for Moody’s, whereas, for
S&P’s and Fitch, we find a negative effect at the 0.10 and 0.15 quantiles of distribution (estimates on the remaining variables are qualitatively similar to what
we report in Tables 2–4).
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Fig. 3. Unconventional monetary policy measures. Note: Data retrieved from Source: ECB website at: http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/ and https://www.ecb.
europa.eu/pub/annual/balance/html/index.en.html.
P. Boumparis et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 79 (2017) 39–71 49press as a proxy for unconventional policies (see e.g. Davies, 2017). From Fig. 3, the ECB purchases and holdings of securities,
which started in 2009, reached 7.68% of Eurozone GDP in 2015 whereas the ECB total balance sheet assets expanded from
10.44% of Eurozone GDP in 2002 to 26.60% in 2015.
Our regressions (available on request) failed to identify a statistically significant negative economic impact of government
expenditure on credit ratings. 17 We also note the high correlation between economic policy uncertainty and the ECB purchases
and holdings of securities for monetary policy purposes as a percentage of Eurozone GDP (this is equal to 0.62) and the high
correlation between economic policy uncertainty and the ECB total balance sheet assets as a percentage of Eurozone GDP (this
is equal to 0.80). These high correlations raised considerable multicollinearity concerns in our estimated regressions. With this
in mind, we re-run the models reported in Tables 2–4 by dropping economic policy uncertainty as a regressor and using instead
unconventional monetary policy. Tables 5–7 report our results using ECB’s purchases and holdings of securities for monetary
policy purposes as a percentage of Eurozone GDP. We treat all explanatory variables as endogenous and use first-order lags
as instruments to account for possible endogeneity issues; this is particularly desirable if one is willing to assume that following
a number of credit rating downgrades, which put an upward pressure on sovereign ratings, ECB responded by authorising (addi-
tional) monetary easing.
From Tables 5–7, we find a negative and statistically significant effect for the ECB variable throughout the credit rating
distribution. To save space, we do not report our estimates using as explanatory variable the ECB total balance sheet assets
as percentage of Eurozone GDP but we note that the impact of the latter variable is also negative and statistically significant
(detailed results are available on request). To further explore the possible endogeneity between credit ratings and ECB eas-
ing, we have used instead lagged ECB purchases and holdings of securities or lagged ECB total balance sheet assets as regres-
sors. Even in this case, the impact of both variables remains negative and statistically significant. We have also pursued this
issue further by employing, as regressors: (a) changes in ECB purchases and holdings of securities (and using lagged changes
as instruments), or (b) lagged changes in ECB purchases and holdings of securities, or (c) changes in ECB total balance sheet
assets (and using lagged changes as instruments), or (d) lagged changes in ECB total balance sheet assets. Even in all these
cases, the negative effect of the above mentioned variables on credit ratings remains dominant (but some of these effects
turn out to be statistically insignificant).
If one is willing to assume that unconventional monetary policy provides a ‘signal’ that Eurozone’s economic recovery is
(at best) shaky, CRAs might arguably be less likely to proceed with sovereign upgrades when monetary easing is adopted.
Admittedly, this argument provides some justification on why we fail to find a positive effect from monetary easing on rat-
ings. As a number of studies have already documented (see e.g. Kinateder and Wagner, forthcoming; De Santis, 2016 and
Koijen et al., 2016), unconventional monetary easing has lowered sovereign yields directly, therefore bypassing the role
of CRAs in affecting sovereign bond yield through their credit rating decisions. Among others, influential academic Taylor
(2016) has warned that extra low (US) interest rates and unconventional monetary policy has brought on a risk-taking
search for yield and excesses in the housing market; similar concerns apply to the Eurozone area where, for instance, a report
by Moody’s Analytics in 2015 also flagged concerns that rising prices and the ECB’s monetary easing have caused the risk of
house price bubbles to resurface. 18 Taylor (2016) went on to note that ‘‘these policies were not effective, and may have been17 Results do not change if we use instead the general government expenditure excluding interest payments-to-GDP ratio, the cyclically adjusted government
expenditure-to-potential GDP ratio or the cyclically adjusted government expenditure excluding interest payments-to-potential GDP ratio.
18 Available from: https://www.economy.com/dismal/analysis/free/255221/QE-Could-Fuel-Housing-Bubbles-in-Europe.
Table 5
Estimates for Moody’s with first order lags as instrumental variables, 200 2015. Model with ECB purchases and holdings of securities for monetary policy purposes as a percentage of Eurozone GDP.
Log GDP per
capita
Government Debt Current Accou Inflation Rate Unemployment
Rate
Regulatory
Quality
Competitiveness ECB Securities AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p l. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
Dependent Variable: Moody’s rating
0.05 0.0982 0.002 0.0462 0.000 0.0573 0 0 0.1620 0.000 0.3852 0.000 3.2467 0.000 0.0235 0.000 0.6303 0.000 9.132 0.586
0.10 0.8461 0.000 0.0533 0.000 0.0422 0 0 0.1388 0.000 0.3754 0.000 2.9814 0.000 0.0402 0.000 0.2783 0.000 9.047 0.601
0.15 0.7454 0.000 0.0363 0.000 0.0243 0 0 0.0786 0.000 0.3060 0.000 3.3980 0.000 0.0315 0.000 0.3938 0.000 8.932 0.616
0.20 2.6789 0.000 0.0401 0.000 0.0241 0 0 0.0000 0.995 0.2671 0.000 3.3091 0.000 0.0349 0.000 0.2362 0.000 8.421 0.632
0.25 2.8139 0.000 0.0335 0.000 0.0238 0 1 0.0785 0.000 0.2494 0.000 3.0454 0.000 0.0420 0.000 0.3585 0.000 8.444 0.638
0.30 12.1451 0.000 0.0426 0.000 0.1838 0 0 0.2163 0.000 0.0551 0.061 2.4439 0.000 0.0044 0.551 0.4361 0.000 9.488 0.577
0.35 3.3152 0.000 0.0293 0.000 0.0998 0 0 0.1871 0.000 0.2773 0.000 5.6845 0.000 0.0500 0.000 0.4927 0.000 8.032 0.618
0.40 4.4521 0.000 0.0124 0.000 0.0511 0 4 0.0303 0.168 0.2144 0.000 3.6921 0.004 0.0336 0.000 0.4494 0.000 7.152 0.614
0.45 5.4926 0.000 0.0155 0.000 0.0347 0 0 0.0535 0.000 0.2175 0.000 2.7009 0.000 0.0281 0.000 0.4541 0.000 7.668 0.622
0.50 6.1522 0.000 0.0161 0.000 0.0303 0 1 0.1145 0.000 0.1686 0.000 1.5742 0.000 0.0227 0.000 0.2444 0.000 8.046 0.601
0.55 6.7348 0.000 0.0197 0.000 0.0217 0 4 0.1518 0.000 0.1330 0.000 0.2679 0.488 0.0120 0.000 0.4158 0.000 8.243 0.590
0.60 2.9593 0.000 0.0216 0.000 0.0919 0 0 0.0381 0.042 0.3023 0.000 0.4427 0.000 0.0333 0.000 0.2245 0.000 8.523 0.609
0.65 8.7199 0.000 0.0231 0.000 0.0012 0 8 0.1523 0.000 0.0154 0.013 0.8722 0.000 0.0067 0.000 0.2019 0.000 8.961 0.507
0.70 8.6453 0.000 0.0252 0.000 0.0096 0 2 0.1593 0.000 0.0262 0.000 0.8000 0.000 0.0152 0.000 0.1590 0.000 8.915 0.472
0.75 9.2649 0.000 0.0309 0.000 0.0175 0 6 0.1238 0.001 0.0167 0.448 0.4819 0.341 0.0222 0.000 0.2185 0.000 8.966 0.510
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. A s the Akaike Information Criterion.
Table 6
Estimates for S&P’s with first order lags as instrumental variables, 2002– 5. Model with ECB purchases and holdings of securities for monetary policy purposes as a percentage of Eurozone GDP.
Log GDP per
capita
Government Debt Current Accou Inflation Rate Unemployment
Rate
Regulatory
Quality
Competitiveness ECB Securities AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p- coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
Dependent Variable: S&P’s rating
0.05 2.3488 0.000 0.0396 0.000 0.0200 0.0 0.1528 0.000 0.2805 0.000 4.5861 0.000 0.0655 0.000 0.3183 0.000 8.669 0.646
0.10 2.7339 0.000 0.0248 0.000 0.0541 0.0 0.1251 0.001 0.3126 0.000 2.5558 0.000 0.0247 0.004 0.1487 0.001 8.344 0.678
0.15 5.0821 0.000 0.0417 0.000 0.0351 0.0 0.2315 0.000 0.2674 0.000 1.2803 0.000 0.0414 0.000 0.3438 0.000 7.605 0.686
0.20 3.8789 0.000 0.0349 0.000 0.1057 0.0 0.1163 0.000 0.3140 0.000 1.3277 0.000 0.0307 0.000 0.3569 0.000 8.157 0.680
0.25 7.2055 0.000 0.0384 0.000 0.0000 0.9 0.2009 0.000 0.3044 0.000 1.0621 0.000 0.0459 0.000 0.3554 0.000 7.847 0.685
0.30 5.1313 0.000 0.0302 0.000 0.0686 0.0 0.1631 0.000 0.3114 0.000 1.4773 0.000 0.0360 0.000 0.3645 0.000 7.323 0.688
0.35 6.3830 0.000 0.0328 0.000 0.0089 0.2 0.2273 0.000 0.2879 0.000 1.6716 0.000 0.0310 0.000 0.3562 0.000 7.716 0.691
0.40 6.4706 0.000 0.0296 0.000 0.0205 0.0 0.2072 0.000 0.2534 0.000 1.1738 0.000 0.0416 0.000 0.2879 0.000 7.580 0.682
0.45 6.6454 0.000 0.0165 0.000 0.0287 0.4 0.2774 0.000 0.2442 0.000 1.1038 0.000 0.0107 0.356 0.5076 0.000 8.204 0.656
0.50 4.8321 0.000 0.0157 0.000 0.0013 0.9 0.3053 0.000 0.2876 0.000 1.5721 0.000 0.0252 0.000 0.0027 0.951 7.115 0.637
0.55 6.6108 0.000 0.0205 0.000 0.0177 0.0 0.2885 0.000 0.2428 0.000 2.0653 0.000 0.0206 0.000 0.0837 0.000 8.229 0.658
0.60 6.5480 0.000 0.0262 0.000 0.0773 0.0 0.1397 0.000 0.3008 0.000 0.3898 0.038 0.0038 0.027 0.1696 0.011 8.076 0.667
0.65 9.8907 0.000 0.0386 0.000 0.0043 0.7 0.1887 0.001 0.1119 0.003 0.2450 0.328 0.0072 0.034 0.0952 0.338 9.069 0.650
0.70 10.7908 0.000 0.0411 0.000 0.0029 0.8 0.1798 0.000 0.0540 0.000 0.2974 0.060 0.0045 0.124 0.1388 0.329 9.234 0.632
0.75 11.4688 0.000 0.0425 0.000 0.0298 0.0 0.1026 0.000 0.0428 0.002 0.7611 0.000 0.0043 0.056 0.1151 0.000 9.350 0.630
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. A s the Akaike Information Criterion.
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Table 7
Estimates for Fitch with first order lags as instrumental variables, 2002–2015. Model with ECB purchases and holdings of securities for monetary policy purposes as a percentage of Eurozone GDP.
Log GDP per
capita
Government Debt Current Account Inflation Rate Unemployment
Rate
Regulatory
Quality
Competitiveness ECB Securities AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
Dependent Variable: Fitch rating
0.05 1.7163 0.000 0.0251 0.000 0.1804 0.000 0.0053 0.000 0.5051 0.000 2.1308 0.000 0.0257 0.000 0.3806 0.000 8.829 0.643
0.10 1.5516 0.000 0.0185 0.000 0.0845 0.000 0.1458 0.000 0.4745 0.000 1.9780 0.000 0.0347 0.000 0.3529 0.000 8.896 0.647
0.15 2.3024 0.000 0.0197 0.000 0.0514 0.000 0.1627 0.000 0.4198 0.000 2.3990 0.000 0.0346 0.000 0.2739 0.000 8.659 0.662
0.20 2.2746 0.000 0.0143 0.000 0.0359 0.000 0.1745 0.000 0.4454 0.000 2.3844 0.000 0.0352 0.000 0.3132 0.000 8.670 0.655
0.25 7.2327 0.000 0.0297 0.000 0.0408 0.196 0.2433 0.000 0.3469 0.000 2.4269 0.000 0.0307 0.000 0.3502 0.000 8.251 0.685
0.30 6.7367 0.000 0.0024 0.390 0.1072 0.000 0.2955 0.000 0.2713 0.000 3.7176 0.000 0.0125 0.029 0.2208 0.000 8.565 0.629
0.35 5.6190 0.000 0.0194 0.000 0.0638 0.286 0.1444 0.000 0.2413 0.000 1.4645 0.001 0.0226 0.349 0.4970 0.050 7.423 0.646
0.40 5.5656 0.000 0.0148 0.000 0.0065 0.000 0.1321 0.000 0.2362 0.000 1.8662 0.000 0.0464 0.000 0.2098 0.000 7.112 0.648
0.45 5.2675 0.000 0.0011 0.449 0.0537 0.000 0.0384 0.036 0.2419 0.000 3.6886 0.000 0.0389 0.000 0.2627 0.000 7.643 0.626
0.50 5.9984 0.000 0.0106 0.001 0.0111 0.180 0.1772 0.000 0.2450 0.000 1.9077 0.000 0.0249 0.000 0.1333 0.000 7.900 0.649
0.55 8.0614 0.000 0.0220 0.000 0.0103 0.510 0.2066 0.000 0.2386 0.000 1.3926 0.000 0.0318 0.000 0.1055 0.223 8.579 0.652
0.60 7.7209 0.000 0.0234 0.000 0.0360 0.002 0.0353 0.765 0.3313 0.000 1.2146 0.183 0.0150 0.027 0.1946 0.159 8.601 0.578
0.65 8.2684 0.000 0.0283 0.000 0.0232 0.053 0.3122 0.000 0.1182 0.000 0.0521 0.829 0.0127 0.000 0.1840 0.000 8.676 0.625
0.70 8.5713 0.000 0.0256 0.000 0.0144 0.002 0.1075 0.000 0.0703 0.000 0.7421 0.000 0.0185 0.000 0.0626 0.000 8.839 0.617
0.75 9.5583 0.000 0.0224 0.000 0.0408 0.000 0.2571 0.000 0.0656 0.000 0.8387 0.000 0.0043 0.001 0.2532 0.000 9.088 0.609
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
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52 P. Boumparis et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 79 (2017) 39–71counterproductive” (Taylor, 2016, p. 2; see also references therein). This is equally applicable to the Eurozone area where
unconventional monetary policy has raised concerns that Eurozone countries have lost the appetite to proceed with structural
reforms; see e.g. German Council of Economic Experts (2016), an issue also (and lively) debated by the November 2016 Centre
for Macroeconomics Survey. 19 As unconventional monetary policies with near zero policy rates have been adopted by major
central banks, Taylor (2016) proceeded with his criticism noting that ‘‘the international monetary system has deviated further
from a sound rules-based system” which in turn has increased exchange rate volatility and has raised suspicions of ‘‘currency
manipulation” (Taylor, 2016, p. 3).
To counteract (some of) these (huge) concerns, it is plausible that CRAs might have reacted by adopting, post 2009, a
much more cautious approach than previously adopted, which would then justify a number of downgrades.
To the best of our knowledge, however, no other research paper has found a direct negative impact of unconventionalmon-
etary easing on Eurozone sovereign ratings. That said, we note the very fresh research by Reusens and Croux (2017) who find
that after the start of the European debt crisis in 2009, the impact of Eurozonemembership on sovereign credit rating decisions
switched from positive to negative. The finding of Reusens and Croux (2017) is justified on the grounds thatmember countries
in amonetary union are prone to a self-fulfilling liquidity crisis. This is becausemember countries cannot force the central bank
to alleviate a liquidity crisis bybuying their governmentdebt; as a result, they can facehigher borrowing costs during a liquidity
crisis. It is the combination of higher borrowing costswith the fact that GDP growth cannot be stimulated through depreciation
of the domestic currency that raises the risk of transforming a liquidity crisis into a solvency crisis.
In any case, we view the results in Tables 5–7 as only tentative. We also note that the reported models in Tables A.4–A.6
(which use economic policy uncertainty rather unconventional monetary policy and tackle endogeneity by using instru-
ments) deliver a better fit in terms of a lower Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) than the models with unconventional mon-
etary policy in Tables 5–7 in 9 out of the 15 quantiles of the rating distribution for Moody’s and S&P’s and in 8 out of the 15
quantiles of the rating distribution for Fitch.20 In any case, we acknowledge that further research is necessary in order to assess
more in detail the relationship between unconventional monetary policy and credit rating decisions.4.3. A series of robustness checks
4.3.1. Model estimates using alternative uncertainty indices
As alternatives to the European policy uncertainty index, we use (a) the US policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2016)
and (b) the Euro area uncertainty proxy of Girardi and Reuter (2017). Like the European policy uncertainty index, the US one
captures the policy related economic uncertainty by counting the number of newspaper articles containing the terms uncer-
tain or uncertainty, economic or economy, and one or more policy-relevant terms of ten leading newspapers (including The
Washington Post, The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal) and can be thought of as capturing spillover US economic
policy effects to the Eurozone area. On the other hand, the Girardi and Reuter (2017) uncertainty measure pools information19 The survey is run by the Centre for Macroeconomics, an ESRC centre established by LSE, UCL, Cambridge, the Bank of England, the National Institute of
Economics and Social Research (NIESR) and now Oxford; see: http://cfmsurvey.org/surveys/german-council-economic-experts-view-ecb-policy.
20 The models in Tables 2–4 (which rely on economic policy uncertainty but do not tackle endogeneity issues) also deliver a better fit in terms of a lower AIC
than the models with unconventional monetary policy in Tables 5–7 in 12 out of the 15 quantiles of the rating distribution for Moody’s, in 7 out of the 15
quantiles of the rating distribution for S&P’s and in 8 out of the 15 quantiles of the rating distribution for Fitch.
P. Boumparis et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 79 (2017) 39–71 53from 22 forward-looking business and consumer survey questions contained in the EU Business and Consumer Surveys pro-
gramme (see Girardi and Reuter, 2017).
The correlation between the European and US policy indices is equal to 0.80 whereas the correlation between the Euro-
pean policy index and the survey-based uncertainty measure of Girardi and Reuter (2017) is much weaker and equal to 0.20.
Fig. 4 plots the three uncertainty measures together with the VSTOXX volatility index which is a measure of financial uncer-
tainty (we discuss this in detail below). Notice that European policy uncertainty is much more volatile than the remaining
uncertainty measures (see also the summary statistics in Table A.2); it also shows a marked increase following from the
2008–2009 financial crisis and the most recent Eurozone debt crisis in 2011–2012. It drops after ECB President Mario Draghi
pledged in 2012 that the ECB was ‘ready to do whatever it takes’ to protect the Eurozone from collapse.21
Appendix Tables A.7–A.9 report the empirical estimates using the US economic policy uncertainty index. As can be seen
from Tables A.7–A.9, there is a spillover negative impact of US uncertainty on Eurozone’s credit ratings but the impact is
smaller compared to the European uncertainty impact reported in Tables 2–4. There is mixed evidence in terms of whether
the model using the European policy uncertainty index dominates the model using the US one. In the case of Moody’s, the
model using the European uncertainty index delivers a lower Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) than the model using the US
index in 7 out of the 15 quantiles of the rating distribution. In the case of S&P’s, the model using the European uncertainty
index delivers a lower AIC than the model using the US index in 6 out of the 15 quantiles of the rating distribution. In the case
of Fitch, however, the dominance of the European index is much stronger; indeed, the model using the European uncertainty
index delivers a lower AIC than the model using the US index in 11 out of the 15 quantiles of the rating distribution. To save
space, we do not report our estimates using the uncertainty survey-based measure of Girardi and Reuter (2017); these esti-
mates are available on request. We note, however, that the statistical evidence in favour of a negative impact of the uncer-
tainty survey-based measure is much weaker (for Moody’s, this happens in 6 out of the 15 quantiles of the rating
distribution; the corresponding figures for S&P’s and Fitch are 7 and 8, respectively).
Compared to the alternative uncertaintymeasures, the stronger impact of the Europeanpolicy uncertainty index should not
necessarily come as a surprise. Policymakers have arguably been rather slow in putting together a workable plan dealing with
the Eurozone crisis as planning requires in general parliamentary approval fromallmember states. In addition, themajor insti-
tutions (nick-named as the ‘Troika’ of the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission and the European Central
Bank) have not always agreed on how to deal with issues of the crisis therefore fuelling policy uncertainty in the Euro area.22
Indeed, Eurozone’s institutional infrastructurewas not prepared to dealwith the crisis. Baldwin andGiavazzi (2015, p. 21) noted in
a critical manner that ‘‘judging from market reactions, each policy intervention made things worse” and that it was only in the
summer of 2012 with the ‘whatever it takes’ assertion by ECB President Mario Draghi that the corner was turned.
As a further robustness check, we consider alternative financial measures of uncertainty. In particular, we consider the
VSTOXX volatility index (see Fig. 4; this is based on EURO STOXX 50 real-time options prices and is designed to reflect
the market expectations of near-term up to long-term volatility by measuring the square root of the implied variance across
all options of a given time to expiration) as well as individual country-level measures, namely stock price volatility.23 Appen-
dix Tables A.10–A.12 report estimates using the VSTOXX index (results are qualitatively similar when we treat all explanatory
variables as endogenous and use their first-order lags as instruments; these are available on request). The VSTOXX index, which
has a mild positive correlation with the economic policy uncertainty measure (the correlation is equal to 0.27), exerts a negative
effect on most credit rating quantiles in the case of Fitch and S&P’s whereas such evidence is less robust in the case of Moody’s.
To save space, we do not report estimates using the country-specific stock price volatility indices (these are available on
request). We note, however, that country-specific volatility indices also exert a predominantly negative effect on credit rat-
ings; we also note that in the case of Moody’s, the impact is statistically insignificant in 6 (out of the 15) quantiles. For S&P’s
and Fitch, the impact is statistically insignificant in 4 and 2 quantiles, respectively.
4.3.2. Other robustness checks
We proceed with further robustness checks. Reusens and Croux (2017) and Afonso et al. (2007, 2011) underline that map-
ping ratings into a linear scale implies that the absolute distances in the underlying degree of creditworthiness between sub-
sequent credit rating categories are equally spaced. This assumption may lead to a significant bias, especially in the presence
of numerous elements in the end categories. Given that 25% of observations are in the highest rating category, the bias might
not be negligible. With this in mind, we proceed with another robustness check. In particular, we follow Afonso et al. (2007)
in considering a logistic transformation of credit ratings (for more details see Appendix 3 in Afonso et al., 2007).
Briefly, the logistic transformation is given by Li ¼ ln½Ri=ð1 RiÞ, where Ri ¼ ð2i 1Þ=ð2ncÞ, the number of categories, nc ,
equals 21 and (from the last column of Table 1) the rating grades are i = 1,2, . . .,21. Fig. A4 plots together the linear and logis-
tic transformation for Moody’s sovereign credit ratings. In the logistic transformation, the differences between categories are
not constant, but are still imposed a priori. Tables A.13–A.15 report our empirical results.
In line with our main results in Tables 2–4, CRAs attribute a higher weight on GDP per capita for high rated countries and
the impact of government debt is higher at the low as opposed to the middle of the rating distribution; at the same time, the21 See e.g. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/9428894/Debt-crisis-Mario-Draghi-pledges-to-do-whatever-it-takes-to-save-euro.html.
22 See e.g. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-33531845.
23 Volatility of stock price index is the 360-day standard deviation of the return on the national stock market index. (Bloomberg). This is available from the
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis database.
0.0000
0.5000
1.0000
1.5000
2.0000
2.5000
3.0000
3.5000
4.0000
4.5000
5.0000
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75
Quanle of sovereign credit rangs
Regulatory quality impact (Quanle panel model)
Regulatory quality impact (Panel model with ﬁxed individual and me eﬀects)
Fig. 5. Impact of regulatory quality on ratings for Moody’s: Quantile panel model versus standard panel model with fixed individual and time effects.
54 P. Boumparis et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 79 (2017) 39–71impact of the unemployment rate remains stronger at the low-to-middle end of the rating distribution. In contrast to our
main results in Tables 2–4, however, the impact of regulatory quality turns out not to be stronger for lower rated countries
and the impact of the current account remains predominantly positive throughout the distribution for the three CRAs.
As a further robustness check, we explore whether our main results in Tables 2–4 also hold by aggregating contiguous
quantiles. Tables A.16–A18 report estimates of the model for the 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75 quantiles for each of the three CRAs.
In line with our main results in Tables 2–4, the impact of competitiveness is stronger at the low quantile of the distribution
and the impact of GDP per capita is stronger at the high quantile of the distribution. In line with our results in Tables 2–4, the
impact of unemployment and regulatory quality is stronger at lower ratings for S&P’s and Fitch but not for Moody’s. As in
Tables 2–4, the impact of the current account is positive at the lower quantiles of the distribution for S&P’s but not for the
other CRAs and the impact of government debt is lower at the middle of the rating distribution for all CRAs.
Reusens and Croux (2017) document that the credit rating agencies changed their sovereign credit rating assessment
after the start of the European debt crisis in 2009 which suggests time-varying credit rating decisions made by the CRAs
(see also Boumparis et al., 2015). If the impact of an explanatory variable varies over time, the greater impact on lower quan-
tiles may depend on a different sample composition in crisis and non-crisis periods; in fact, there may be more countries in
lower quantiles during crisis periods. To deal with this issue, we attempted to re-estimate our panel quantile model in two
separate periods: 2002–2008 and 2009–2015, respectively. Bearing in mind the very small sample in these separate periods,
a rather large number of our coefficient estimates turned out to be statistically insignificant throughout the credit rating dis-
tribution. In any case, the quantile model, estimated over the whole sample period, provides a reasonable representation of
the economic impact of our qualitative and quantitative factors on credit ratings since it is more robust than standard linear
models to outliers and combines information before and during the crisis. That said, and given the interest of our paper in the
European economic policy uncertainty variable, we pursue the issue of time-varying effects further by estimating a time-
varying model which allows for the impact of all explanatory variables to change during periods of high policy uncertainty
(when policy uncertainty exceeds its sample mean) as opposed to periods of low uncertainty (when policy uncertainty falls
below its sample mean). In particular, we model credit ratings Yit as follows:Yit ¼ b0 þ ðbLowGDPGDP per Capitat þ bLowDebtDebtt þ bLowca current accounttþ
þbLowinf inflationt þ bLowu unemploymentt þ bLowReg Reg qualitytþ
þbLowcompcompetitivenesst þ bLowunc uncertaintyt þ bLowfiscalfiscaltÞð1 Iunct Þþ
þðbHighGDP GDP per Capitat þ bHighDebtDebttþ
þbHighca current accountt þ bHighinf inflationtþ
þbHighu unemploymentt þ bHighReg Reg qualitytþ
þbHighcompcompetitivenesst þ bHighunc uncertaintyt þ bHighfiscalfiscaltÞIunct þ uit ;
ð7Þwhere the indicator function
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Fig. 6. Impact of competitiveness on ratings for Fitch: Quantile panel model versus standard panel model with fixed individual and time effects.
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1; if uncertaintyt > uncertainty
0; otherwise
( )
; ð8Þallowing also for fixed individual and time effects. In model (7) and (8), the impact of (say) GDP per capita switches from bLowGDP
(when uncertainty is below its mean, that is, Iunct ¼ 0) to bHighGDP (when uncertainty is above its mean, that is, Iunct ¼ 1; similar
arguments hold for the remaining variables). Notice that model (7) and (8) also allows for the differential impact from the
fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio which turned out to be statistically insignificant in Section 4.2 of the paper. Doing so allows us to
assess whether the impact of fiscal balance changes as we move from periods of low uncertainty to periods of high
uncertainty.
Estimates of model (7) and (8) reported in Table A.19 suggest that GDP per capita, government debt, uncertainty and
indeed the fiscal-balance-to-GDP ratio have a stronger economic impact on credit rating decisions for all CRAs when uncer-
tainty is high (from Fig. 4, our European economic policy uncertainty exceeds its mean (reported in Table A.2) of 137.553
from 2010 onwards) whereas current account, competitiveness, the unemployment rate and inflation have a stronger eco-
nomic impact on credit rating decisions when uncertainty is low (in our sample this happens over the 2002–2009 period).
The F-tests also reported in Table A.19 test for equal effects from each control variable across regimes (low versus high
uncertainty). In general, the F-tests confirm equality for the majority of coefficients across regimes. That said, some statistical
evidence in favour of differential impact from some of the control variables across regimes remains. This is most evident (in
terms of very low p-values) for government debt in the case of Moody’s and S&P’s. We also note that, for all CRAs, the impact
of the fiscal balance switches from negative (and statistically insignificant) during periods of low uncertainty to positive (and
statistically significant) during periods of high uncertainty. Hence, our results for the fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio are in line
with those of Reusens and Croux (2017) who identified a significant positive effect from the fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio on
credit ratings only after 2009.
Finally, our quantile panel model offers valuable and additional information compared to a standard panel model with
fixed individual and time effects; detailed estimates of the latter model for all three CRAs are available on request. We illus-
trate some differences between the two models by focusing on the impact of regulatory quality in Fig. 5 and on the impact of
competitiveness in Fig. 6. Fig. 5 plots the estimated impact of regulatory quality for Moody’s across the conditional distribu-
tion of credit ratings (based on the quantile panel model reported in Table 2) together with the estimated impact of regu-
latory quality for a standard panel model with fixed individual and time effects (which is equal to 2.912); the latter focuses
on the conditional mean response of credit ratings. Fig. 6 plots the estimated impact of competitiveness for Fitch across the
conditional distribution of credit ratings (based on the quantile panel model reported in Table 4) together with the estimated
impact of competitiveness for the standard panel model with fixed individual and time effects (which is equal to 0.0286).
Table 10
Impact of European policy uncertainty on ratings for Fitch.
Year Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Cyprus
2008 0.143 0.087 0.175 0.036 0.087 0.348
2009 0.134 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.062 0.249
2010 0.837 0.386 0.361 0.861 0.066 0.717
2011 3.187 0.531 1.185 3.187 0.987 1.152
2012 3.670 0.611 1.236 3.670 1.327 3.670
2013 2.876 0.479 0.479 2.876 1.040 2.876
2014 1.653 0.557 0.275 1.653 0.557 1.653
2015 2.196 0.644 0.740 0.794 0.740 2.196
Notes: Table 10 illustrates the effects of European policy uncertainty on credit ratings by using estimates of our credit rating model under uncertainty to
infer what credit ratings would have been had uncertainty remained at its 1999–2001 average value. To do this, we construct the difference between the
fitted values of the estimates of credit rating model (1) for Fitch (as reported in Table 4) and the fitted values of the counterfactual model (1) which sets the
post 2007 values of the uncertainty variable equal to its 1999–2001 average.
Table 9
Impact of European policy uncertainty on ratings for S&P’s.
Year Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Cyprus
2008 0.535 0.228 0.235 0.541 0.300 0.235
2009 0.298 0.018 0.168 0.328 0.276 0.168
2010 1.603 1.162 0.484 1.502 0.052 1.162
2011 2.206 1.184 1.600 1.130 1.538 1.130
2012 2.540 1.363 1.302 2.540 1.302 2.540
2013 1.991 1.069 1.020 1.991 1.020 1.991
2014 1.144 0.788 0.586 1.144 0.586 1.144
2015 1.520 0.459 0.779 0.779 1.424 1.520
Notes: Table 9 illustrates the effects of European policy uncertainty on credit ratings by using estimates of our credit rating model under uncertainty to infer
what credit ratings would have been had uncertainty remained at its 1999–2001 average value. To do this, we construct the difference between the fitted
values of the estimates of credit rating model (1) for S&P’s (as reported in Table 3) and the fitted values of the counterfactual model (1) which sets the post
2007 values of the uncertainty variable equal to its 1999–2001 average.
Table 8
Impact of European policy uncertainty on ratings for Moody’s.
Year Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Cyprus
2008 0.677 0.268 0.559 0.559 0.268 0.495
2009 0.444 0.158 0.400 0.354 0.191 0.354
2010 1.154 0.868 1.154 2.243 0.456 1.022
2011 3.266 3.266 1.762 3.266 3.088 1.588
2012 3.761 3.761 1.376 3.761 1.829 3.761
2013 2.948 1.433 1.079 2.948 1.433 2.948
2014 1.694 0.620 0.620 0.824 0.620 1.694
2015 2.251 0.811 0.824 1.094 0.824 2.251
Notes: Table 8 illustrates the effects of European policy uncertainty on credit ratings by using estimates of our credit rating model under uncertainty to infer
what credit ratings would have been had uncertainty remained at its 1999–2001 average value. To do this, we construct the difference between the fitted
values of the estimates of credit rating model (1) for Moody’s (as reported in Table 2) and the fitted values of the counterfactual model (1) which sets the
post 2007 values of the uncertainty variable equal to its 1999–2001 average.
56 P. Boumparis et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 79 (2017) 39–71As can be seen from Figs. 5 and 6, relying on the impact of the model with fixed effects misses valuable information across
the quantile distribution that can only be captured by the quantile panel model discussed throughout this paper.245. Discussion of results and policy implications
From a policy point of view, and noting the higher relative importance of the competitiveness and regulatory quality
indices for Eurozone countries with low credit ratings, our results suggest that structural reforms and improvements in24 From Figs. 1 and 2, there is relatively low time variation in regulatory quality and competitiveness which suggests that the impact effects of our quantile
model reported in Figs. 5 and 6 mainly explore the cross-country dimension.
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their borrowing costs in financial markets. This is in line with policy recommendations recently put forward by the European
Commission.25 In addition, a decrease in policy uncertainty in the Eurozone area could definitely favour all countries, but low
rated would gain more in terms of their credit rating score. We also note the potential of indirect spillover effects from sovereign
credit rating decisions on low rated countries to Eurozone’s sovereign bond yields; for instance, De Santis (2014) identifies spil-
lover effects in terms of the direct impact of a Greek credit rating downgrade on other Eurozone sovereign yields.
We can illustrate the effects of European uncertainty on credit ratings by using estimates of our credit rating model under
uncertainty to infer what credit ratings would have been had uncertainty remained at its pre-financial and pre-European
debt crisis average value. Notice that we choose as representative of the pre-financial and pre-European crisis the average
value over 1999–2001 rather than the average value over 2002–2007 because, following from our discussion at the end
of Section 2 (and in Section 4.2), the latter period could be interpreted as the pre-crisis unsustainable exuberance. Contrast
this with the 1999–2001 period which covers the first three years of the life of the Euro. Over this arguably more ‘cautious’
period, the ECB discount rate recorded an average of 4.73% and the EONIA rate (the one-day interbank interest rate for the
Eurozone) recorded an average of 3.75%; on the other hand, over the 2002–2007 period the ECB discount rate recorded a
lower average of 3.71% and the EONIA rate recorded a lower average of 2.74%.26
We illustrate the effects of European uncertainty on credit ratings by constructing the difference between the fitted val-
ues of the estimates of credit rating model (1) for each CRA (as reported in Tables 2–4) and the fitted values of the counter-
factual model (1) which sets the post 2007 values of the uncertainty variable equal to its 1999–2001 average. Tables 8–10
report the difference between the fitted and the counterfactual values for Eurozone’s periphery, namely all GIIPS (that is,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and Cyprus where a negative value of this difference indicates that credit ratings
are lower because of the increased uncertainty.
Our estimates suggest that economic policy uncertainty has impacted negatively on the credit ratings of all GIIPS and
Cyprus during the 2008–2015 period. The impact has been more prolonged for Greece. Notice that uncertainty has reduced
Greece’s credit rating by some 3 to 4 notches at the height of the Eurozone crisis in 2011 and 2012 (the impact is higher in
the case of Moody’s and Fitch and slightly lower in the case of S&P’s). This is not surprising. Greece has witnessed successive
bail-outs and still remains (at the time of writing this paper) on bail-out support.27
From Tables 8–10, the impact of uncertainty on the remaining GIIPS and Cyprus is still substantial but, in general, less
severe than what Greece witnessed (Portugal suffered, due to uncertainty, the same rating downgrades as Greece in
2011–2014; Cyprus suffered, due to uncertainty, the same rating downgrades as Greece in 2012–2015).28 Again, this should
not come as a surprise as the remaining GIIPS and Cyprus witnessed less ‘expensive’ and ‘smoother’ bail-outs; in fact, all these
countries are now off bail-out support.29
Earlier work by Livingston et al. (2010) suggests that Moody’s is more conservative (in the sense that it gives more inferior
ratings) than S&P’s using data on US corporate bond rating decisions. From Tables 8–10, the impact of uncertainty on the
GIIPS and Cyprus is in general more severe for Moody’s than for S&P’s and for Fitch. Hence, our findings support the work
of Livingston et al. (2010) in the sense that, since the recent financial and Eurozone crises, Moody’s have remained more con-
servative than the other CRAs because of European policy uncertainty concerns.
Returning to Greece, we note that the Boards of Directors of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and European
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 30 adopted, in January 2017, a set of short-term debt relief measures for Greece aiming at
a cumulative reduction of Greece’s debt-to-GDP ratio of around 20 percentage points until 2060.31
Policymakers from the so-called ‘Troika’ have repeatedly pointed out that Greece needs to proceed with structural
reforms and improve its competitiveness as prerequisites for getting substantial ‘medium term relief’. At the time of writing,
Greece stood at the 0.05 quantile of the rating distribution of S&P’s (and the remaining CRAs), some 5 notches deep into ‘junk
status territory’ 32 faced with a 7% servicing cost for its 10-year debt; this was some 3 percentage points higher than the 10-year25 See: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2016/cr2016_comm_en.pdf.
26 See https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/INTDSREZQ193N and http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=198.EON.D.EONIA_TO.RATE.
27 Greece, which was bailed-out twice (for €110bn in 2010 and then again for €109bn in 2011), negotiated, in February 2012, a new €130bn rescue package
involving a voluntary haircut of some 53.5% on the face value of its bonds held by the private sector. Eurozone ministers agreed (in November 2012) to cut
Greece’s debt by a further €40bn. In July 2015, Greece was bailed-out for a third time for €86bn.
28 Notice, in Tables 8–10, some overlapping for a number of countries in a number of years. This should not come as a surprise. For a given quantile, the
difference between the fitted values of the estimates of our credit rating model and the fitted values of the counterfactual model is equal to the estimated
coefficient on uncertainty (for the quantile in question) times the difference between uncertainty in time period t and mean uncertainty (over 1999–2001).
Recall that European uncertainty does not vary at the cross-sectional dimension. When two (or more) countries are placed in the same quantile of the rating
distribution for a given time period t, the difference between the fitted values of the estimates of our credit rating model and the fitted values of the
counterfactual model is the same.
29 Ireland was bailed-out for €85bn in November 2010. Portugal was bailed-out for €78bn in May 2011. Spain was granted, in July 2012, financial assistance
from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) for up to €100bn. Cyprus was bailed-out for €10bn in March 2013. See, for instance, the discussion in Dergiades
et al., 2015 and The Financial Times ‘dedicated’ website (at https://www.ft.com/topics/themes/Greece_Debt_Crisis).
30 ESM is a European Union permanent agency that provides financial assistance, in the form of loans, to Eurozone countries or as new capital to banks in
difficulty. It has replaced the temporary EFSF.
31 See: https://www.esm.europa.eu/press-releases/esm-and-efsf-approve-short-term-debt-relief-measures-greece.
32 In 2017, the S&P’s, Moody’s and Fitch credit rating scores for Greece were B-, Caa3, and CCC, respectively. From Table 1, junk (or high credit risk) sovereign
bonds carry a credit rating of BB+ or lower for S&P’s and Fitch and a credit rating of Ba1 or lower for Moody’s.
58 P. Boumparis et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 79 (2017) 39–71Portuguese yield and 5 percentage points higher than the 10-year Spanish yield. Future rating upgrades of Greece (triggered, for
instance, by accelerating structure reforms) will definitely push down Greek borrowing costs.33
Although a deep front ‘voluntary’ haircut on Greek debt is not on the ‘negotiating table’, our estimates (in Table 3 for
S&P’s) suggest that a haircut of as many as 36 percentage points in the debt-to-GDP ratio (that is, from 179.7% in 2016 to
143.7% in 2017) will, ceteris paribus, raise Greece’s credit rating by only 1 notch (36⁄0.0277; results are similar using
the estimates in Table 2 for Moody’s and in Table 4 for Fitch, respectively). A speedier and much more realistic (since debt
haircut is not on the ‘negotiating table’) Greek exit from the ‘junk status territory’ would indeed be triggered by structural
reforms (and an improvement in competitiveness). For instance, our estimates (in Table 3 for S&P’s) suggest that Greece
would witness an upgrade of almost 3 notches34 by S&P’s, if it were to implement structural reforms that would raise its reg-
ulatory quality index to the level observed for Portugal.6. Conclusions
This paper examines the determinants of sovereign credit ratings for the Eurozone countries from 2002 to 2015 in a panel
quantile framework which allows the relative significance of the explanatory variables to vary across the quantile distribu-
tion of sovereign ratings. Our results are summarised as follows: First, the impact of the unemployment rate, regulatory
quality and competitiveness is stronger for low rated countries whereas GDP per capita is a major driver of high rated coun-
tries; in other words, the high level of GDP per capita provides a ‘safety net’ safeguarding (to some extent) against down-
grades in the case of high rated countries. Second, a reduction in the current account deficit or an increase in the current
account surplus leads to a rating or outlook upgrade for low rated countries which have historically recorded high current
account deficits whereas, for countries with strong payment capacity, a higher current account deficit or a lower current
account surplus is associated with either higher creditworthiness or positive economic prospects of the economy and con-
sequently a higher sovereign rating. Third, economic policy uncertainty impacts negatively on credit ratings across the quan-
tile distribution; however, the impact is stronger on the lower rated countries. In other words, the creditworthiness of low
rated countries takes a much bigger ‘hit’ than that of high rated countries when European uncertainty is on the rise.
Our model, which allows for differential impact across the rating distribution, could arguably go some way towards shed-
ding some light on how CRAs assign sovereign credit ratings. For instance, our counterfactual analysis suggests the pivotal
role that economic policy uncertainty in the Euro area has played in driving down sovereign credit ratings in Eurozone’s
periphery. We believe that our empirical analysis and results provide valuable information which can potentially be used
by a new credit rating agency towards making credit rating decisions if indeed European policymakers decide to set up such
an agency in the near future.Acknowledgements
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See Figs. A1–A4 and Tables A.1–A.1933 Gibson et al. (2017) discuss in detail the strong interaction between sovereign ratings, sovereign borrowing costs and bank ratings in the Eurozone area.
34 We derive 3 notches as [(0.940–0.397)*5.075]; 5.075 is the estimated coefficient on regulatory quality and 0.947 and 0.397 refer to the regulatory quality
values for Portugal and Greece, respectively.
Fig. A3. Mapping of sovereign credit ratings to quantile distribution for Fitch.
Fig. A2. Mapping of sovereign credit ratings to quantile distribution for S&P’s.
Fig. A1. Mapping of sovereign credit ratings to quantile distribution for Moody’s.
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Table A.1
Data definitions and sources.
Data Definitions
Variable Name Definition Source
Fitch rating Sovereign rating attributed at 31st December of each year Fitch
S&P’s rating Sovereign rating attributed at 31st December of each year S&P’s
Moody’s rating Sovereign rating attributed at 31st December of each year Moody’s
GDP per capita Log GDP per capita, US dollars, constant 2005 prices World Bank
Government debt General government gross dedt as a percent of GDP IMF WEO
Current account balance Current account balance as a percent of GDP IMF WEO
Unemployment Rate Unemployment rate as a percent of total labour force IMF WEO
Inflation Rate Annual growth rate of consumer price index IMF WEO
Regulatory Quality Aggregate government indicator World Bank
Competitiveness Indicator Harmonised competitiveness indicator based on unit labour costs ECB
indices for the total economy
European Policy Uncertainty Eurozone’s countries average www.policyuncertainty.com
US Policy Uncertainty United State’s Policy Uncertainty www.policyuncertainty.com
Survey based Uncertainty Uncertainty measure which pools information from 22 forward-looking Girardi and Reuter (2017)
Business and consumer survey questions contained in the EU Business
and Consumer Surveys programme
ECB Securities ECB purchases and holdings of securities as a percent of Eurozone GDP ECB Database
ECB Balance Sheet Annual consolidated balance sheet of the Eurosystem as a ECB Database
percent of Eurozone GDP
VSTOXX Index Market expectations of near-term up to long-term volatility www.stoxx.com
Stock Market Volatilility Country specific stock market volatility Fred
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Fig. A4. Linear and logistic transformation of sovereign credit ratings for Moody’s.
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Table A.2
Summary statistics of the data variables.
Variable Min. 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile Max. St. Dev.
Moody’s ratings 1 15.670 18.330 17.461 21 21 3.997
S&P’s ratings 2 15.415 18.000 17.343 21 21 3.711
Fitch ratings 4 15.330 18.330 17.549 21 21 3.669
Log GDP per capita 3.904 4.294 4.491 4.474 4.652 5.041 0.244
Government debt 3.664 35.783 61.717 61.771 85.067 178.396 36.227
Current account
balance
20.918 5.007 0.623 1.168 2.563 11.923 6.108
Inflation Rate 1.706 1.124 2.175 2.282 3.174 15.252 2.036
Unemployment Rate 2.500 5.982 8.246 9.171 11.038 27.251 4.617
Regulatory Quality 0.345 0.987 1.236 1.262 1.557 1.921 0.352
Competitiveness
Indicator
81.733 98.940 105.490 109.852 114.678 180.527 18.095
European Policy
Uncertainty
76.955 101.337 131.890 137.553 167.255 209.986 42.489
US Policy Uncertainty 67.136 87.878 126.870 116.888 141.448 157.977 31.426
Survey Based
Uncertainty
88.290 92.422 96.426 97.826 101.031 113.648 7.724
ECB Securities 0 0 0.155 1.396 2.374 7.684 2.072
ECB Balance Sheet 0.104 0.123 0.207 0.190 0.229 0.301 2.036
VSTOXX Index 14.045 18.567 24.332 24.858 32.111 37.285 7.207
Stock Market
Volatilility
8.170 14.337 19.208 21.477 26.975 61.334 9.764
Table A.3
Information on the credit rating distribution, 2002–2015.
Moody’s S&P’s Fitch
Quantile Country Year Quantile Country Year Quantile Country Year
0.05 Greece 2011–2015 0.05 Greece 2010–2015 0.05 Greece 2011–2015
Ireland 2011–2012 Portugal 2012–2014 Cyprus 2012–2015
Portugal 2011–2013 Cyprus 2012–2015 Portugal 2011–2014
Cyprus 2012–2015 Latvia 2009 Latvia 2009
Slovenia 2013 0.10 Italy 2012–2015 0.10 Greece 2010
0.10 Greece 2010 Spain 2012–2014 Latvia 2008, 2010, 2011
Ireland 2013 Portugal 2011, 2015 Portugal 2015
Portugal 2014–2015 Cyprus 2011 Slovakia 2002
Spain 2012–2013 Latvia 2008, 2010, 2011 Spain 2012–2013
Cyprus 2011 Lithuania 2009 Lithuania 2002, 2009–2012
Latvia 2009–2012 0.15 Greece 2009 Cyprus 2011
Slovenia 2012, 2014, 2015 Ireland 2011–2013 0.15 Greece 2009
0.15 Italy 2012–2015 Latvia 2007, 2012 Ireland 2010–2013
Ireland 2010, 2014 Slovakia 2002, 2003 Italy 2013–2014
Spain 2014, 2015 Lithuania 2002, 2008, 2010–
2013
Estonia 2009
Latvia 2013, 2014 0.20 Spain 2015 Latvia 2002, 2012
Lithuania 2009–2012 Portugal 2010 Slovakia 2003
0.20 Ireland 2015 Estonia 2002, 2009 Slovenia 2013
Latvia 2008, 2015 Latvia 2002–2005, 2013 Lithuania 2008, 2013
Malta 2002–2005, 2012–
2015
Malta 2012–2015 0.20 Ireland 2014
Lithuania 2002, 2013–2014 Lithuania 2015 Italy 2012, 2015
0.25 Greece 2009 0.25 Ireland 2010 Spain 2014–2015
Italy 2011 Italy 2011 Estonia 2002, 2008
Cyprus 2002 Cyprus 2010 Latvia 2003, 2007, 2013
Malta 2006, 2011 Estonia 2003 Slovenia 2012, 2014, 2015
Slovakia 2002–2004, 2012 Latvia 2006, 2014, 2015 Lithuania 2013
Lithuania 2003–2005, 2008,
2015
Slovenia 2013–2015 0.25 Ireland 2007
0.30 Cyprus 2003–2006 Lithuania 2004, 2014, 2015 Estonia 2003
Latvia 2002–2005, 2007 Slovakia 2004 Latvia 2004–2006,
2014–2015
Slovakia 2013–2015 0.30 Greece 2004–2008 Slovakia 2004
Lithuania 2006, 2007 Estonia 2007–2008 Lithuania 2004–2007,
2014–2015
(continued on next page)
P. Boumparis et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 79 (2017) 39–71 61
Table A.3 (continued)
Moody’s S&P’s Fitch
Quantile Country Year Quantile Country Year Quantile Country Year
0.35 Greece 2002–2006 Malta 2002–2011 0.30 Greece 2004–2008
Portugal 2010 Slovenia 2012 Estonia 2006–2007, 2010
Spain 2011 Lithuania 2007 Malta 2002,2013–2015
Estonia 2007–2009 0.35 Greece 2004–2008 Slovakia 2005–2006
Latvia 2006 Ireland 2014 0.35 Greece 2002–2003
Malta 2007 Cyprus 2002–2006 Italy 2011
Slovakia 2005 Estonia 2004, 2006, 2010 Cyprus 2002
Slovenia 2011 0.40 Greece 2002 Portugal 2010
0.40 Estonia 2002–2005,
2010–2015
Portugal 2009 Estonia 2004, 2005
Malta 2008–2010 Cyprus 2007 Malta 2003–2006
Slovakia 2007 Slovakia 2005–2007,
2011–2014
Slovakia 2007–2008
0.45 Belgium 2011–2015 Estonia 2005 Slovenia 2002
Greece 2007–2008 Slovenia 2002 0.40 Estonia 2011–2015
Cyprus 2007 Lithuania 2005–2006 Malta 2007–2012
Estonia 2006 0.45 Greece 2003 Slovakia 2009–2011
Slovakia 2006,2008–2011 Ireland 2015 0.45 Slovakia 2012–2015
0.50 Italy 2002–2006 Italy 2006–2010 Cyprus 2003–2010
France 2015 Cyprus 2008–2009 Spain 2011
Portugal 2009 Slovakia 2008–2010, 2015 Slovenia 2003
Cyprus 2008–2010 Slovenia 2003 0.50 Belgium 2012, 2014, 2015
Slovenia 2002–2005 0.50 Italy 2004–2005 Italy 2005–2010
0.55 Italy 2007–2010 Portugal 2005–2008 Ireland 2009
Portugal 2002–2008 Spain 2011 Portugal 2009
Slovenia 2008–2010 Estonia 2011–2015 Slovenia 2004, 2005, 2011
0.60 Belgium 2004–2010 Slovenia 2004, 2011 0.55 Belgium 2002–2005,2013
France 2012–2014 0.55 Belgium 2011–2015 France 2014, 2015
Ireland 2009 France 2013–2015 Italy 2002–2004
Spain 2010 Ireland 2009 Portugal 2002–2006
Slovenia 2006–2007 Italy 2003 0.60 Austria 2015
0.65 Belgium 2002–2003 Portugal 2004 Belgium 2006–2011
Austria 2012, 2013, 2015 Spain 2010 Portugal 2007–2008
Finland 2015 Slovenia 2005, 2010 Slovenia 2006–2010
Germany 2012, 2013 0.60 Austria 2012–2015 0.65 France 2011–2013
Luxemburg 2012, 2013 Belgium 2010 Finland 2015
Netherlands 2012, 2013 France 2012 Netherlands 2013
0.70–0.75 Austria 2002–2011, 2014 Italy 2002 Spain 2002–2010
Finland 2002–2014 Portugal 2002–2003 France 2002–2007
France 2002–2011 Spain 2009 0.70–
0.75
Austria 2002–2014
Germany 2002–2011,
2014–2015
Slovenia 2006–2009 Finland 2002–2014
Ireland 2002–2008 0.65 Belgium 2002–2009 France 2008–2010
Luxemburg 2002–2011, 2014,
2015
Finland 2014 Germany 2002–2015
Netherlands 2002–2011, 2014,
2015
Austria 2011 Ireland 2002–2008
Spain 2002–2009 Netherlands 2013–2014 Luxemburg 2002–2015
Spain 2002–2003 Netherlands 2002–2014
0.70 Finland 2011, 2012, 2015 Spain 2003–2009
France 2011
Germany 2011
Luxemburg 2011, 2012
Netherlands 2011, 2012
Spain 2004–2008
0.75 Austria 2002–2010
Finland 2002–2010, 2013
France 2002–2010
Germany 2002–2010,
2012–2015
Ireland 2002–2008
Netherlands 2002–2010, 2015
Luxemburg 2002–2010,
2013–2015
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Table A.4
Estimates for Moody’s with first order lags as instrumental variables, 2002–2015.
Log GDP per
capita
Government Debt Current Account Inflation Rate Unemployment
Rate
Regulatory
Quality
Competitiveness Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
Dependent Variable: Moody’s rating
0.05 0.7718 0.000 0.0272 0.000 0.1196 0.000 0.2586 0.000 0.3085 0.000 4.2377 0.000 0.0476 0.000 0.0307 0.000 9.150 0.593
0.10 0.5901 0.000 0.0390 0.000 0.0580 0.000 0.0355 0.000 0.3339 0.000 4.2815 0.000 0.0361 0.000 0.0158 0.000 9.064 0.594
0.15 0.8942 0.000 0.0396 0.000 0.0158 0.000 0.0143 0.000 0.2801 0.000 3.7907 0.000 0.0376 0.000 0.0108 0.000 8.801 0.609
0.20 2.7490 0.000 0.0412 0.000 0.0030 0.000 0.0328 0.000 0.2265 0.000 3.7852 0.000 0.0367 0.000 0.0104 0.000 8.288 0.626
0.25 5.8908 0.000 0.0456 0.000 0.0179 0.008 0.1727 0.000 0.1720 0.000 2.6823 0.000 0.0199 0.000 0.0165 0.000 7.401 0.638
0.30 4.6627 0.000 0.0304 0.000 0.1361 0.000 0.1292 0.000 0.0936 0.000 6.3281 0.000 0.0177 0.000 0.0087 0.000 7.774 0.575
0.35 4.2664 0.000 0.0223 0.000 0.0379 0.000 0.0257 0.283 0.1272 0.000 4.0622 0.000 0.0298 0.000 0.0172 0.000 7.126 0.626
0.40 3.9472 0.000 0.0056 0.015 0.0209 0.024 0.0234 0.454 0.2066 0.000 3.2522 0.000 0.0379 0.000 0.0146 0.000 7.578 0.585
0.45 3.0212 0.000 0.0035 0.014 0.0707 0.019 0.0439 0.018 0.2055 0.000 4.9529 0.000 0.0403 0.000 0.0176 0.000 7.904 0.583
0.50 2.7157 0.001 0.0074 0.295 0.0648 0.000 0.0743 0.324 0.2392 0.000 3.2915 0.000 0.0093 0.038 0.0106 0.000 7.792 0.554
0.55 8.1312 0.000 0.0318 0.000 0.0003 0.978 0.1885 0.000 0.0999 0.000 0.0333 0.915 0.0224 0.000 0.0122 0.000 8.358 0.570
0.60 5.4859 0.000 0.0111 0.030 0.0309 0.159 0.1036 0.025 0.1875 0.000 1.5205 0.001 0.0290 0.000 0.0091 0.000 7.258 0.568
0.65 8.1615 0.000 0.0217 0.000 0.0377 0.000 0.1567 0.012 0.0658 0.000 0.6343 0.000 0.0157 0.000 0.0037 0.307 8.608 0.509
0.70 9.4343 0.000 0.0264 0.000 0.0342 0.000 0.0781 0.021 0.0191 0.015 0.2237 0.299 0.0193 0.000 0.0052 0.000 8.841 0.496
0.75 10.5101 0.000 0.0357 0.000 0.0379 0.003 0.1316 0.000 0.0251 0.113 0.1774 0.398 0.0222 0.000 0.0087 0.001 8.983 0.502
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
Table A.5
Estimates for S&P’s with first order lags as instrumental variables, 2002–2015.
Log GDP per
capita
Government Debt Current Account Inflation Rate Unemployment
Rate
Regulatory
Quality
Competitiveness Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
Dependent Variable: S&P’s rating
0.05 0.2561 0.223 0.0332 0.000 0.0996 0.000 0.1097 0.000 0.3598 0.000 5.0597 0.000 0.0704 0.000 0.0224 0.000 9.049 0.629
0.10 3.1985 0.000 0.0336 0.000 0.0123 0.000 0.0188 0.000 0.2321 0.000 3.1895 0.000 0.0540 0.000 0.0091 0.000 8.277 0.666
0.15 4.1839 0.000 0.0403 0.000 0.0425 0.000 0.1568 0.000 0.2497 0.000 1.8321 0.000 0.0425 0.000 0.0128 0.000 8.048 0.680
0.20 3.8653 0.000 0.0317 0.000 0.0616 0.000 0.0849 0.006 0.2305 0.000 2.4660 0.000 0.0412 0.000 0.0145 0.000 8.034 0.684
0.25 5.2135 0.000 0.0386 0.000 0.0713 0.002 0.1237 0.000 0.2467 0.000 1.7475 0.000 0.0456 0.000 0.0167 0.000 7.554 0.685
0.30 4.5990 0.000 0.0285 0.000 0.0421 0.001 0.0986 0.000 0.2503 0.000 2.4420 0.000 0.0466 0.000 0.0124 0.000 7.663 0.682
0.35 5.0184 0.000 0.0234 0.000 0.0311 0.000 0.1279 0.000 0.1890 0.000 2.5447 0.000 0.0393 0.000 0.0154 0.000 7.068 0.679
0.40 7.0828 0.000 0.0235 0.000 0.0323 0.452 0.2229 0.000 0.2458 0.000 1.5197 0.000 0.0227 0.009 0.0113 0.000 8.059 0.674
0.45 5.8402 0.000 0.0189 0.000 0.0128 0.593 0.1645 0.016 0.2379 0.000 2.0647 0.000 0.0289 0.000 0.0088 0.000 7.406 0.672
0.50 6.6124 0.000 0.0222 0.000 0.0113 0.212 0.2705 0.000 0.2465 0.000 1.5298 0.000 0.0210 0.000 0.0053 0.025 7.938 0.666
0.55 5.1502 0.000 0.0213 0.000 0.0181 0.029 0.0020 0.927 0.2167 0.000 3.6500 0.000 0.0184 0.000 0.0004 0.863 7.684 0.664
0.60 7.9678 0.000 0.0281 0.000 0.0271 0.007 0.0017 0.957 0.1486 0.000 0.0360 0.907 0.0041 0.081 0.0056 0.000 8.517 0.661
0.65 8.2714 0.000 0.0321 0.000 0.0111 0.416 0.2254 0.007 0.1171 0.000 0.8732 0.001 0.0254 0.000 0.0067 0.289 8.490 0.654
0.70 10.5796 0.000 0.0422 0.000 0.0138 0.002 0.1360 0.000 0.0601 0.000 0.2215 0.092 0.0039 0.009 0.0071 0.007 9.033 0.640
0.75 11.5694 0.000 0.0378 0.000 0.0127 0.122 0.1121 0.000 0.0254 0.000 0.3859 0.054 0.0028 0.161 0.0048 0.383 9.209 0.605
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
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Table A.6
Estimates for Fitch with first order lags as instrumental variables, 2002–2015.
Log GDP per
capita
Government Debt Current Account Inflation Rate Unemployment
Rate
Regulatory
Quality
Competitiveness Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
Dependent Variable: Fitch rating
0.05 0.5366 0.000 0.0204 0.000 0.1048 0.000 0.0159 0.000 0.4264 0.000 1.6633 0.000 0.0492 0.000 0.0297 0.000 9.113 0.587
0.10 0.4317 0.000 0.0093 0.000 0.0646 0.000 0.1265 0.000 0.4788 0.000 3.5251 0.000 0.0380 0.000 0.0052 0.000 9.028 0.611
0.15 1.9404 0.000 0.0240 0.000 0.0662 0.000 0.1173 0.000 0.4323 0.000 2.6932 0.000 0.0421 0.000 0.0042 0.000 8.662 0.645
0.20 3.7112 0.000 0.0213 0.000 0.0246 0.000 0.1000 0.000 0.3350 0.000 2.6471 0.000 0.0437 0.000 0.0091 0.000 8.086 0.663
0.25 4.4816 0.000 0.0185 0.000 0.0020 0.756 0.1843 0.000 0.3376 0.000 2.3379 0.000 0.0379 0.000 0.0095 0.000 7.643 0.664
0.30 4.4702 0.000 0.0026 0.245 0.0674 0.000 0.1153 0.001 0.2963 0.000 3.8467 0.000 0.0235 0.000 0.0046 0.000 6.999 0.633
0.35 6.3135 0.000 0.0052 0.112 0.0613 0.287 0.0742 0.047 0.2090 0.000 2.7420 0.000 0.0297 0.005 0.0107 0.000 7.962 0.625
0.40 6.5421 0.000 0.0082 0.001 0.0443 0.164 0.1001 0.131 0.2181 0.000 2.3106 0.000 0.0397 0.000 0.0154 0.000 7.765 0.626
0.45 5.9594 0.000 0.0117 0.000 0.0195 0.146 0.1031 0.063 0.2269 0.000 2.6819 0.000 0.0372 0.000 0.0039 0.284 7.676 0.637
0.50 5.9069 0.000 0.0177 0.000 0.0405 0.000 0.2021 0.000 0.2611 0.000 2.1313 0.000 0.0374 0.000 0.0053 0.000 7.589 0.627
0.55 7.3734 0.000 0.0133 0.000 0.0199 0.000 0.0637 0.000 0.2130 0.000 1.8956 0.000 0.0221 0.000 0.0048 0.000 8.382 0.647
0.60 6.1613 0.000 0.0178 0.000 0.0217 0.000 0.1767 0.000 0.2968 0.000 0.3757 0.000 0.0073 0.012 0.0087 0.000 7.809 0.665
0.65 7.9307 0.000 0.0205 0.000 0.0029 0.756 0.0691 0.002 0.2220 0.000 0.9636 0.000 0.0079 0.013 0.0073 0.010 8.627 0.623
0.70 9.5834 0.000 0.0344 0.000 0.0781 0.000 0.1846 0.000 0.0804 0.000 0.1674 0.263 0.0190 0.000 0.0055 0.013 8.806 0.625
0.75 11.6596 0.000 0.0355 0.000 0.0642 0.000 0.1174 0.008 0.0070 0.426 0.1257 0.591 0.0129 0.000 0.0025 0.476 9.184 0.566
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
Table A.7
Estimates for Moody’s using the US policy uncertainty index, 2002–2015.
Log GDP per
capita
Government Debt Current Account Inflation Rate Unemployment
Rate
Regulatory
Quality
Competitiveness US Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
Dependent Variable: Moody’s rating
0.05 1.0811 0.000 0.0463 0.000 0.0798 0.000 0.1869 0.000 0.3495 0.000 4.2204 0.000 0.0390 0.000 0.0105 0.000 9.125 0.553
0.10 0.0365 0.000 0.0510 0.000 0.0451 0.000 0.0346 0.000 0.3460 0.000 3.5093 0.000 0.0454 0.000 0.0090 0.000 9.039 0.570
0.15 2.4221 0.000 0.0460 0.000 0.0298 0.000 0.0239 0.000 0.2643 0.000 3.6139 0.000 0.0364 0.000 0.0011 0.000 8.360 0.602
0.20 2.1861 0.000 0.0416 0.000 0.0049 0.000 0.0104 0.000 0.2914 0.000 4.0044 0.000 0.0434 0.000 0.0050 0.000 8.476 0.608
0.25 2.8051 0.000 0.0318 0.000 0.0276 0.000 0.0144 0.324 0.2250 0.000 4.3131 0.000 0.0399 0.000 0.0102 0.000 8.166 0.610
0.30 4.2157 0.000 0.0295 0.000 0.0348 0.003 0.0851 0.001 0.1798 0.000 5.0614 0.000 0.0479 0.000 0.0032 0.335 7.060 0.588
0.35 3.8584 0.000 0.0245 0.000 0.0717 0.000 0.0248 0.116 0.1511 0.000 4.7225 0.000 0.0504 0.000 0.0128 0.000 7.579 0.586
0.40 4.2968 0.000 0.0250 0.000 0.0368 0.000 0.0411 0.006 0.1663 0.000 3.7575 0.000 0.0468 0.000 0.0013 0.569 7.228 0.586
0.45 4.5009 0.000 0.0082 0.001 0.0256 0.001 0.0305 0.220 0.2563 0.000 3.5760 0.000 0.0272 0.000 0.0097 0.001 7.050 0.577
0.50 6.4926 0.000 0.0153 0.000 0.0811 0.000 0.0845 0.000 0.1773 0.000 1.9668 0.000 0.0326 0.000 0.0087 0.009 8.152 0.533
0.55 6.7314 0.000 0.0196 0.000 0.0078 0.120 0.0476 0.000 0.1232 0.000 1.0435 0.000 0.0358 0.000 0.0034 0.189 7.994 0.527
0.60 5.9102 0.000 0.0152 0.000 0.0328 0.000 0.0019 0.842 0.2000 0.000 0.9797 0.000 0.0174 0.000 0.0127 0.000 7.585 0.569
0.65 7.5368 0.000 0.0163 0.001 0.0560 0.363 0.0246 0.267 0.0631 0.000 0.8085 0.148 0.0128 0.050 0.0054 0.407 8.510 0.516
0.70 8.2166 0.000 0.0201 0.000 0.0393 0.000 0.1358 0.000 0.0800 0.000 0.4679 0.005 0.0192 0.000 0.0009 0.569 8.612 0.486
0.75 9.5034 0.000 0.0257 0.000 0.0445 0.000 0.1482 0.000 0.0332 0.463 0.1742 0.012 0.0156 0.000 0.0140 0.174 8.951 0.420
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
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Table A.8
Estimates for S&P’s using the US policy uncertainty index, 2002–2015.
Log GDP per
capita
Government Debt Current Account Inflation Rate Unemployment
Rate
Regulatory
Quality
Competitiveness US Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
Dependent Variable: S&P’s rating
0.05 1.0733 0.000 0.0455 0.000 0.0714 0.000 0.0970 0.000 0.3025 0.000 4.1584 0.000 0.0764 0.000 0.0198 0.000 8.965 0.615
0.10 4.1456 0.000 0.0398 0.000 0.0020 0.453 0.1039 0.000 0.2420 0.000 2.2753 0.000 0.0398 0.000 0.0008 0.849 7.707 0.668
0.15 7.3733 0.000 0.0542 0.000 0.0238 0.034 0.1443 0.000 0.1919 0.000 0.9407 0.000 0.0364 0.000 0.0019 0.375 7.971 0.672
0.20 4.3276 0.000 0.0414 0.000 0.0767 0.000 0.1416 0.000 0.3205 0.000 2.6185 0.000 0.0213 0.000 0.0251 0.000 7.819 0.658
0.25 3.7672 0.000 0.0248 0.000 0.0519 0.000 0.0537 0.000 0.2790 0.000 3.0710 0.000 0.0452 0.000 0.0125 0.000 7.985 0.665
0.30 5.3187 0.000 0.0250 0.000 0.0143 0.022 0.0288 0.118 0.1949 0.000 3.5621 0.000 0.0434 0.000 0.0016 0.595 7.281 0.660
0.35 4.4419 0.000 0.0306 0.000 0.0248 0.013 0.2510 0.000 0.2719 0.000 2.8031 0.000 0.0437 0.000 0.0065 0.000 7.605 0.666
0.40 5.3021 0.000 0.0213 0.000 0.0171 0.006 0.1674 0.000 0.2376 0.000 2.1254 0.000 0.0342 0.000 0.0049 0.159 6.948 0.661
0.45 7.2741 0.000 0.0229 0.000 0.0190 0.079 0.1977 0.000 0.2624 0.000 1.9839 0.000 0.0313 0.000 0.0075 0.001 8.166 0.658
0.50 5.8615 0.000 0.0177 0.000 0.0046 0.840 0.0878 0.000 0.2357 0.000 2.3395 0.000 0.0001 0.991 0.0002 0.918 8.089 0.666
0.55 7.4878 0.000 0.0125 0.006 0.0181 0.487 0.1858 0.000 0.2607 0.000 1.8494 0.000 0.0280 0.000 0.0128 0.024 8.271 0.624
0.60 10.7138 0.000 0.0381 0.000 0.0661 0.046 0.0819 0.011 0.1080 0.000 0.6225 0.000 0.0086 0.001 0.0283 0.003 9.038 0.610
0.65 9.8143 0.000 0.0343 0.000 0.0123 0.000 0.1153 0.013 0.0898 0.000 0.9291 0.000 0.0075 0.002 0.0048 0.160 8.953 0.639
0.70 10.7290 0.000 0.0310 0.000 0.0453 0.000 0.2093 0.000 0.0967 0.000 0.4517 0.229 0.0012 0.819 0.0046 0.082 9.105 0.610
0.75 11.3388 0.000 0.0399 0.000 0.0016 0.873 0.0665 0.000 0.0346 0.212 0.3835 0.026 0.0056 0.009 0.0114 0.331 9.147 0.614
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
Table A.9
Estimates for Fitch using the US policy uncertainty index, 2002–2015.
Log GDP per
capita
Government Debt Current Account Inflation Rate Unemployment
Rate
Regulatory
Quality
Competitiveness US Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
Dependent Variable: Fitch rating
0.05 1.6295 0.000 0.0408 0.000 0.0589 0.000 0.2168 0.000 0.4458 0.000 1.1758 0.000 0.0329 0.000 0.0126 0.000 8.871 0.603
0.10 1.6581 0.000 0.0250 0.000 0.0282 0.000 0.2082 0.000 0.4687 0.000 2.6636 0.000 0.0468 0.000 0.0029 0.000 8.766 0.631
0.15 1.9947 0.000 0.0266 0.000 0.0478 0.000 0.1543 0.000 0.4698 0.000 2.7098 0.000 0.0367 0.000 0.0032 0.000 8.595 0.638
0.20 2.9458 0.000 0.0229 0.000 0.0318 0.000 0.1051 0.000 0.3810 0.000 3.0963 0.000 0.0410 0.000 0.0056 0.000 8.305 0.653
0.25 4.4844 0.000 0.0155 0.000 0.0428 0.007 0.1952 0.000 0.3602 0.000 2.8791 0.000 0.0391 0.000 0.0129 0.009 7.594 0.644
0.30 3.0192 0.000 0.0124 0.000 0.0251 0.000 0.0799 0.000 0.3332 0.000 3.3293 0.000 0.0371 0.000 0.0040 0.000 8.100 0.647
0.35 4.5063 0.000 0.0224 0.000 0.0132 0.727 0.0882 0.000 0.1951 0.000 3.5161 0.000 0.0263 0.003 0.0115 0.000 6.913 0.655
0.40 6.3075 0.000 0.0125 0.000 0.0371 0.000 0.1339 0.000 0.1951 0.000 2.4441 0.000 0.0405 0.000 0.0037 0.385 7.840 0.617
0.45 6.6617 0.000 0.0101 0.000 0.0317 0.000 0.0819 0.000 0.2160 0.000 2.9831 0.000 0.0413 0.000 0.0104 0.000 8.010 0.619
0.50 5.8961 0.000 0.0154 0.000 0.0149 0.280 0.1328 0.000 0.2610 0.000 2.2834 0.000 0.0234 0.000 0.0002 0.951 7.761 0.655
0.55 8.9905 0.000 0.0320 0.000 0.0097 0.399 0.1322 0.000 0.2261 0.000 0.2419 0.682 0.0257 0.000 0.0029 0.068 8.670 0.660
0.60 9.4244 0.000 0.0222 0.000 0.0320 0.000 0.0241 0.223 0.2069 0.000 0.1083 0.063 0.0037 0.068 0.0002 0.484 8.873 0.633
0.65 9.9326 0.000 0.0195 0.000 0.0603 0.000 0.1353 0.000 0.1377 0.000 0.8549 0.000 0.0086 0.001 0.0015 0.090 8.989 0.604
0.70 10.7658 0.000 0.0315 0.000 0.0450 0.000 0.1552 0.000 0.0706 0.000 0.8198 0.000 0.0064 0.000 0.0006 0.513 9.121 0.598
0.75 12.0175 0.000 0.0344 0.000 0.0866 0.000 0.1331 0.000 0.0101 0.514 0.2083 0.143 0.0120 0.000 0.0014 0.787 9.253 0.545
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
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Table A.10
Estimates for Moody’s using the VSTOXX Index, 2002–2015.
Log GDP per
capita
Government Debt Current Account Inflation Rate Unemployment
Rate
Regulatory
Quality
Competitiveness VSTOXX AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
Dependent Variable: Moody’s rating
0.05 0.5947 0.000 0.0573 0.000 0.0488 0.000 0.0079 0.000 0.3321 0.000 3.5708 0.000 0.0418 0.000 0.0036 0.000 9.229 0.543
0.10 1.8367 0.000 0.0544 0.000 0.0249 0.000 0.1075 0.000 0.3753 0.000 3.1279 0.000 0.0413 0.000 0.0234 0.000 8.797 0.594
0.15 2.4471 0.000 0.0463 0.000 0.0266 0.000 0.0721 0.000 0.2755 0.000 3.6921 0.000 0.0393 0.000 0.0264 0.000 8.471 0.607
0.20 1.9858 0.000 0.0401 0.000 0.0180 0.000 0.0464 0.000 0.2636 0.000 4.1464 0.000 0.0379 0.000 0.0053 0.000 8.553 0.602
0.25 5.1499 0.000 0.0494 0.000 0.0642 0.000 0.0282 0.234 0.1466 0.000 4.6431 0.000 0.0579 0.000 0.0179 0.321 7.211 0.593
0.30 4.8611 0.000 0.0471 0.000 0.0014 0.872 0.0097 0.631 0.2757 0.000 2.7736 0.000 0.0670 0.000 0.0650 0.000 7.620 0.610
0.35 4.3375 0.000 0.0260 0.000 0.0441 0.000 0.0513 0.249 0.2128 0.000 4.1043 0.000 0.0429 0.000 0.0259 0.001 7.190 0.601
0.40 7.0711 0.000 0.0493 0.000 0.0652 0.007 0.0409 0.027 0.1993 0.000 1.9121 0.000 0.0567 0.000 0.0448 0.008 8.057 0.618
0.45 5.7018 0.000 0.0286 0.000 0.0428 0.000 0.0560 0.002 0.2735 0.000 2.1918 0.000 0.0442 0.000 0.0049 0.478 7.329 0.607
0.50 4.6937 0.000 0.0096 0.000 0.0620 0.000 0.0173 0.329 0.2571 0.000 2.1176 0.000 0.0208 0.000 0.0653 0.000 7.503 0.582
0.55 4.5924 0.000 0.0181 0.000 0.0357 0.000 0.1464 0.000 0.2600 0.000 1.7677 0.000 0.0428 0.000 0.0203 0.000 7.677 0.560
0.60 4.8898 0.000 0.0118 0.003 0.0074 0.191 0.1001 0.006 0.2677 0.000 1.7089 0.000 0.0210 0.000 0.0312 0.001 7.219 0.553
0.65 7.5341 0.000 0.0170 0.000 0.0133 0.299 0.0446 0.340 0.0220 0.254 1.0373 0.004 0.0115 0.001 0.0667 0.069 8.817 0.472
0.70 8.8436 0.000 0.0234 0.000 0.0259 0.000 0.1296 0.000 0.0081 0.261 0.4023 0.000 0.0185 0.000 0.0153 0.003 8.939 0.445
0.75 10.7643 0.000 0.0320 0.000 0.0740 0.000 0.1761 0.000 0.0085 0.111 0.0944 0.117 0.0176 0.000 0.0189 0.001 9.228 0.448
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
Table A.11
Estimates for S&P’s using the VSTOXX Index, 2002–2015.
Log GDP per
capita
Government
Debt
Current Account Inflation Rate Unemployment
Rate
Regulatory
Quality
Competitiveness VSTOXX AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
Dependent Variable: S&P’s rating
0.05 4.3560 0.000 0.0516 0.000 0.0572 0.000 0.0556 0.023 0.3047 0.000 3.6484 0.000 0.0834 0.000 0.0143 0.076 8.264 0.629
0.10 3.9244 0.000 0.0411 0.000 0.0138 0.030 0.1468 0.000 0.2489 0.000 2.4025 0.000 0.0423 0.000 0.0248 0.000 7.965 0.668
0.15 4.5966 0.000 0.0362 0.000 0.0065 0.598 0.1074 0.001 0.2612 0.000 1.6889 0.000 0.0355 0.000 0.0061 0.497 7.597 0.674
0.20 3.3710 0.000 0.0334 0.000 0.0688 0.000 0.1210 0.000 0.3463 0.000 1.7185 0.000 0.0413 0.000 0.0227 0.000 8.446 0.658
0.25 3.3561 0.000 0.0293 0.000 0.0422 0.000 0.0631 0.000 0.3292 0.000 2.4683 0.000 0.0544 0.000 0.0199 0.000 8.440 0.654
0.30 3.5936 0.000 0.0281 0.000 0.0372 0.000 0.1007 0.000 0.3345 0.000 2.4101 0.000 0.0525 0.000 0.0182 0.000 8.342 0.655
0.35 5.8348 0.000 0.0347 0.000 0.0187 0.002 0.1759 0.000 0.2800 0.000 1.9644 0.000 0.0442 0.000 0.0437 0.000 7.042 0.663
0.40 6.5271 0.000 0.0223 0.000 0.0225 0.008 0.2269 0.000 0.2825 0.000 1.5658 0.000 0.0274 0.000 0.0045 0.055 8.031 0.658
0.45 7.1554 0.000 0.0267 0.000 0.0329 0.000 0.2049 0.000 0.2592 0.000 1.8267 0.000 0.0294 0.000 0.0165 0.124 8.357 0.667
0.50 4.6324 0.000 0.0008 0.913 0.0185 0.325 0.1538 0.000 0.2379 0.000 3.0916 0.000 0.0003 0.972 0.0196 0.050 7.735 0.616
0.55 6.3325 0.000 0.0167 0.000 0.0189 0.176 0.1476 0.000 0.2969 0.000 1.5121 0.000 0.0202 0.000 0.0048 0.541 8.034 0.653
0.60 7.8473 0.000 0.0304 0.000 0.0150 0.098 0.0942 0.052 0.2064 0.000 0.6148 0.000 0.0116 0.000 0.0225 0.375 8.583 0.662
0.65 7.3435 0.000 0.0285 0.000 0.0088 0.293 0.2021 0.000 0.2428 0.000 1.1100 0.000 0.0111 0.001 0.0357 0.153 8.412 0.660
0.70 10.7695 0.000 0.0392 0.000 0.0406 0.232 0.0197 0.525 0.0965 0.000 0.0873 0.760 0.0053 0.150 0.0008 0.958 9.230 0.627
0.75 11.4410 0.000 0.0406 0.000 0.0305 0.018 0.1527 0.000 0.0606 0.000 0.3733 0.243 0.0034 0.007 0.0283 0.000 9.355 0.614
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
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Table A.12
Estimates for Fitch using the VSTOXX Index, 2002–2015.
Log GDP per
capita
Government Debt Current Account Inflation Rate Unemployment
Rate
Regulatory
Quality
Competitiveness VSTOXX AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
Dependent Variable: Fitch rating
0.05 1.3817 0.000 0.0368 0.000 0.0683 0.000 0.1674 0.000 0.4793 0.000 1.1989 0.000 0.0223 0.000 0.0245 0.000 8.973 0.600
0.10 2.3787 0.000 0.0293 0.000 0.0395 0.000 0.1116 0.000 0.4765 0.000 1.7970 0.000 0.0451 0.000 0.0147 0.000 8.764 0.634
0.15 2.8089 0.000 0.0307 0.000 0.0302 0.000 0.1261 0.000 0.4171 0.000 2.6206 0.000 0.0469 0.000 0.0168 0.000 8.568 0.646
0.20 3.0571 0.000 0.0253 0.000 0.0397 0.000 0.1219 0.000 0.3897 0.000 2.8993 0.000 0.0384 0.000 0.0114 0.000 8.398 0.653
0.25 3.1353 0.000 0.0132 0.000 0.0062 0.025 0.1439 0.000 0.3742 0.000 2.9353 0.000 0.0394 0.000 0.0254 0.000 8.329 0.640
0.30 2.8284 0.000 0.0112 0.000 0.0303 0.000 0.0906 0.000 0.3538 0.000 3.3367 0.000 0.0393 0.000 0.0212 0.004 8.359 0.638
0.35 4.1667 0.000 0.0099 0.000 0.0011 0.925 0.0345 0.028 0.2514 0.000 3.4002 0.000 0.0428 0.000 0.0180 0.000 7.465 0.629
0.40 6.6971 0.000 0.0142 0.000 0.0407 0.000 0.1192 0.000 0.1881 0.000 2.3593 0.000 0.0425 0.000 0.0095 0.000 8.169 0.613
0.45 6.4497 0.000 0.0146 0.000 0.0203 0.069 0.1356 0.000 0.2512 0.000 2.0276 0.000 0.0362 0.000 0.0020 0.903 8.018 0.635
0.50 5.7450 0.000 0.0150 0.000 0.0202 0.101 0.1498 0.000 0.2540 0.000 2.2877 0.000 0.0306 0.000 0.0204 0.481 7.611 0.644
0.55 7.0485 0.000 0.0089 0.000 0.0380 0.000 0.1156 0.000 0.2421 0.000 1.7029 0.000 0.0314 0.000 0.0002 0.970 8.359 0.612
0.60 8.8340 0.000 0.0168 0.000 0.0326 0.000 0.0333 0.001 0.2350 0.000 0.6186 0.000 0.0143 0.000 0.0029 0.284 8.881 0.633
0.65 10.4714 0.000 0.0249 0.000 0.0554 0.000 0.0650 0.000 0.1227 0.000 0.6952 0.000 0.0113 0.000 0.0063 0.504 9.197 0.610
0.70 10.3694 0.000 0.0294 0.000 0.0305 0.000 0.1128 0.000 0.0692 0.000 0.6678 0.000 0.0067 0.000 0.0093 0.221 9.213 0.598
0.75 11.3894 0.000 0.0319 0.000 0.0706 0.000 0.1248 0.000 0.0042 0.744 0.3957 0.024 0.0111 0.000 0.0161 0.756 9.324 0.546
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
Table A.13
Estimates for Moody’s using the logistic transformation of credit ratings, 2002–2015.
Log GDP per
capita
Government Debt Current Account Inflation Rate Unemployment
Rate
Regulatory
Quality
Competitiveness Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
Dependent Variable: Moody’s rating
0.05 1.1032 0.000 0.0227 0.000 0.0374 0.000 0.0102 0.000 0.0550 0.000 0.7624 0.000 0.0110 0.000 0.0083 0.000 6.402 0.594
0.10 1.5177 0.000 0.0178 0.000 0.0187 0.000 0.0272 0.000 0.0571 0.000 0.6525 0.000 0.0109 0.000 0.0057 0.000 7.062 0.647
0.15 1.4150 0.000 0.0133 0.000 0.0057 0.000 0.0218 0.000 0.0637 0.000 1.0924 0.000 0.0133 0.000 0.0033 0.000 7.185 0.685
0.20 2.1942 0.000 0.0108 0.000 0.0209 0.000 0.0346 0.000 0.0151 0.000 1.2755 0.000 0.0155 0.000 0.0075 0.000 7.920 0.716
0.25 2.0932 0.000 0.0090 0.000 0.0185 0.000 0.0427 0.000 0.0270 0.000 1.4078 0.000 0.0177 0.000 0.0061 0.000 7.874 0.713
0.30 2.1249 0.000 0.0088 0.000 0.0143 0.000 0.0292 0.000 0.0219 0.000 1.5144 0.000 0.0158 0.000 0.0069 0.000 7.934 0.714
0.35 1.9753 0.000 0.0054 0.000 0.0037 0.147 0.0163 0.024 0.0380 0.000 1.7480 0.000 0.0179 0.000 0.0065 0.000 7.860 0.699
0.40 2.2048 0.000 0.0079 0.000 0.0216 0.000 0.0140 0.000 0.0458 0.000 1.2185 0.000 0.0155 0.000 0.0069 0.000 7.906 0.713
0.45 2.1618 0.000 0.0067 0.000 0.0003 0.911 0.0126 0.010 0.0450 0.000 1.7573 0.000 0.0114 0.000 0.0044 0.000 8.088 0.707
0.50 2.9363 0.000 0.0095 0.000 0.0006 0.000 0.0108 0.000 0.0225 0.000 1.3902 0.000 0.0115 0.000 0.0037 0.000 8.397 0.709
0.55 2.7975 0.000 0.0089 0.000 0.0053 0.000 0.0005 0.735 0.0292 0.000 1.3197 0.000 0.0116 0.000 0.0031 0.000 8.336 0.705
0.60 2.9579 0.000 0.0094 0.000 0.0116 0.000 0.0001 0.839 0.0196 0.000 1.2237 0.000 0.0134 0.000 0.0041 0.000 8.363 0.703
0.65 3.6052 0.000 0.0117 0.000 0.0029 0.000 0.0130 0.000 0.0058 0.000 1.0512 0.000 0.0143 0.000 0.0028 0.000 8.574 0.690
0.70 3.5192 0.000 0.0108 0.000 0.0135 0.000 0.0361 0.000 0.0020 0.242 1.1578 0.000 0.0124 0.000 0.0031 0.000 8.570 0.687
0.75 4.6784 0.000 0.0182 0.000 0.0155 0.001 0.0430 0.000 0.0178 0.000 0.6108 0.000 0.0180 0.000 0.0022 0.000 8.793 0.669
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
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Table A.14
Estimates for S&P’s using the logistic transformation of credit ratings, 2002–2015.
Log GDP per
capita
Government Debt Current Account Inflation Rate Unemployment
Rate
Regulatory
Quality
Competitiveness Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
Dependent Variable: S&P’s rating
0.05 1.5817 0.000 0.0223 0.000 0.0559 0.000 0.0066 0.000 0.0230 0.000 0.0028 0.854 0.0126 0.000 0.0029 0.000 6.929 0.625
0.10 2.4802 0.000 0.0170 0.000 0.0209 0.000 0.0134 0.239 0.0320 0.000 0.0314 0.450 0.0095 0.000 0.0008 0.229 8.008 0.713
0.15 2.3591 0.000 0.0152 0.000 0.0151 0.000 0.0382 0.000 0.0227 0.000 0.2270 0.000 0.0103 0.000 0.0030 0.000 7.947 0.739
0.20 1.9495 0.000 0.0124 0.000 0.0349 0.000 0.0023 0.002 0.0315 0.000 0.5100 0.000 0.0157 0.000 0.0068 0.000 7.518 0.744
0.25 2.7208 0.000 0.0121 0.000 0.0052 0.500 0.0366 0.009 0.0312 0.000 0.7436 0.000 0.0116 0.000 0.0033 0.000 8.211 0.755
0.30 2.2107 0.000 0.0091 0.000 0.0146 0.000 0.0064 0.117 0.0407 0.000 1.2701 0.000 0.0171 0.000 0.0054 0.000 7.925 0.750
0.35 2.7392 0.000 0.0103 0.000 0.0261 0.000 0.0143 0.000 0.0413 0.000 0.9204 0.000 0.0145 0.000 0.0064 0.000 8.169 0.757
0.40 2.7061 0.000 0.0099 0.000 0.0243 0.000 0.0303 0.000 0.0527 0.000 0.8854 0.000 0.0063 0.000 0.0067 0.000 8.226 0.753
0.45 2.8194 0.000 0.0112 0.000 0.0131 0.000 0.0105 0.000 0.0207 0.000 1.2592 0.000 0.0150 0.000 0.0042 0.000 8.289 0.753
0.50 3.2946 0.000 0.0121 0.000 0.0080 0.000 0.0087 0.000 0.0146 0.000 1.1768 0.000 0.0134 0.000 0.0020 0.000 8.497 0.743
0.55 3.8432 0.000 0.0133 0.000 0.0094 0.001 0.0473 0.000 0.0180 0.003 0.9677 0.000 0.0112 0.000 0.0015 0.028 8.656 0.733
0.60 3.4735 0.000 0.0133 0.000 0.0072 0.000 0.0220 0.000 0.0012 0.137 1.0589 0.000 0.0105 0.000 0.0038 0.000 8.551 0.746
0.65 3.3608 0.000 0.0125 0.000 0.0114 0.000 0.0201 0.000 0.0163 0.000 1.0201 0.000 0.0105 0.000 0.0030 0.000 8.513 0.748
0.70 3.5504 0.000 0.0133 0.000 0.0166 0.000 0.0480 0.000 0.0090 0.000 0.8911 0.000 0.0089 0.000 0.0060 0.000 8.542 0.749
0.75 3.6980 0.000 0.0142 0.000 0.0318 0.000 0.0176 0.000 0.0071 0.000 0.7027 0.000 0.0127 0.000 0.0058 0.000 8.546 0.749
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
Table A.15
Estimates for Fitch using the logistic transformation of credit ratings, 2002–2015.
Log GDP per
capita
Government Debt Current Account Inflation Rate Unemployment
Rate
Regulatory
Quality
Competitiveness Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
Dependent Variable: Fitch rating
0.05 2.0925 0.000 0.0170 0.000 0.0298 0.001 0.0623 0.468 0.0868 0.132 0.0996 0.734 0.0227 0.143 0.0003 0.959 7.402 0.676
0.10 2.0858 0.000 0.0131 0.000 0.0159 0.000 0.0207 0.000 0.0623 0.000 0.2304 0.000 0.0117 0.000 0.0038 0.000 7.659 0.718
0.15 1.8391 0.000 0.0116 0.000 0.0241 0.000 0.0230 0.000 0.0628 0.000 0.5185 0.000 0.0148 0.000 0.0037 0.000 7.462 0.732
0.20 2.0147 0.000 0.0093 0.000 0.0145 0.000 0.0239 0.000 0.0559 0.000 1.3751 0.000 0.0173 0.000 0.0040 0.000 7.681 0.736
0.25 2.5496 0.000 0.0112 0.000 0.0162 0.000 0.0265 0.000 0.0269 0.000 1.3764 0.000 0.0172 0.000 0.0048 0.000 7.837 0.737
0.30 2.2540 0.000 0.0052 0.000 0.0206 0.028 0.0133 0.258 0.0432 0.000 1.6239 0.001 0.0123 0.000 0.0065 0.000 8.011 0.735
0.35 2.3828 0.000 0.0105 0.000 0.0225 0.000 0.0287 0.011 0.0551 0.000 1.2426 0.000 0.0166 0.000 0.0049 0.000 8.327 0.746
0.40 2.2575 0.000 0.0067 0.000 0.0132 0.000 0.0078 0.000 0.0407 0.000 1.4678 0.000 0.0184 0.000 0.0042 0.000 7.975 0.738
0.45 2.7712 0.000 0.0091 0.000 0.0137 0.000 0.0029 0.157 0.0366 0.000 1.3434 0.000 0.0149 0.000 0.0038 0.000 8.114 0.742
0.50 3.1470 0.000 0.0115 0.000 0.0022 0.000 0.0072 0.000 0.0296 0.000 1.2347 0.000 0.0148 0.000 0.0016 0.000 8.475 0.739
0.55 2.8728 0.000 0.0095 0.000 0.0003 0.735 0.0276 0.000 0.0247 0.000 1.5375 0.000 0.0142 0.000 0.0021 0.000 8.493 0.737
0.60 3.1799 0.000 0.0104 0.000 0.0014 0.000 0.0277 0.000 0.0306 0.000 1.2051 0.000 0.0151 0.000 0.0013 0.000 8.464 0.738
0.65 3.4661 0.000 0.0115 0.000 0.0000 0.979 0.0118 0.000 0.0281 0.000 1.0828 0.000 0.0155 0.000 0.0010 0.000 8.561 0.734
0.70 4.0320 0.000 0.0132 0.000 0.0094 0.002 0.0325 0.000 0.0112 0.001 0.8881 0.000 0.0144 0.000 0.0019 0.000 8.690 0.734
0.75 4.7317 0.000 0.0170 0.000 0.0003 0.947 0.0524 0.000 0.0020 0.663 0.7137 0.000 0.0093 0.000 0.0016 0.126 8.926 0.711
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
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Table A.16
Estimates for Moody’s using 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 quantiles only, 2002–2015.
Log GDP per
capita
Government Debt Current Account Inflation Rate Unemployment
Rate
Regulatory
Quality
Competitiveness Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
Dependent Variable: Moody’s rating
0.25 4.8044 0.000 0.0454 0.000 0.0233 0.000 0.0535 0.000 0.1833 0.000 3.4437 0.000 0.0371 0.000 0.0155 0.000 7.433 0.638
0.50 0.4957 0.402 0.0029 0.346 0.1765 0.000 0.0599 0.024 0.3933 0.000 4.2232 0.000 0.0342 0.000 0.0164 0.000 9.119 0.480
0.75 8.3338 0.000 0.0307 0.000 0.0621 0.000 0.0611 0.002 0.0276 0.000 0.8808 0.000 0.0283 0.000 0.0003 0.847 8.780 0.541
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
Table A.17
Estimates for S&P’s using 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 quantiles only, 2002–2015.
Log GDP per
capita
Government Debt Current Account Inflation Rate Unemployment
Rate
Regulatory
Quality
Competitiveness Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
Dependent Variable: S&P’s rating
0.25 5.1247 0.000 0.0322 0.000 0.0435 0.000 0.1412 0.000 0.2650 0.000 2.2195 0.000 0.0372 0.000 0.0169 0.000 7.457 0.689
0.50 6.3872 0.000 0.0206 0.000 0.0241 0.000 0.1118 0.000 0.2036 0.000 1.5716 0.000 0.0249 0.000 0.0088 0.000 7.949 0.676
0.75 11.7268 0.000 0.0385 0.000 0.0024 0.858 0.0624 0.045 0.0257 0.013 0.0438 0.654 0.0032 0.164 0.0108 0.000 9.336 0.618
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
Table A.18
Estimates for Fitch using 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 quantiles only, 2002–2015.
Log GDP per
capita
Government Debt Current Account Inflation Rate Unemployment
Rate
Regulatory
Quality
Competitiveness Uncertainty AIC Pseudo R2
quantile coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
Dependent Variable: Fitch rating
0.25 5.1840 0.000 0.0217 0.000 0.0157 0.590 0.1585 0.000 0.3349 0.000 3.1566 0.000 0.0411 0.000 0.0087 0.000 7.116 0.667
0.50 6.2213 0.000 0.0188 0.000 0.0361 0.000 0.1417 0.000 0.2789 0.000 1.9710 0.000 0.0322 0.000 0.0006 0.470 7.856 0.657
0.75 8.4409 0.000 0.0277 0.000 0.0433 0.000 0.0747 0.024 0.2333 0.000 1.1140 0.000 0.0239 0.000 0.0168 0.000 8.865 0.594
Notes: Figures in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
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Table A.19
Estimates of time-varying model (7) and (8) in main text, 2002–2015.
Moody’s S&P’s Fitch
coef. p-val. coef. p-val. coef. p-val.
Constant 22.650 0.187 24.337 0.117 38.787 0.010
Uncertainty < Sample Mean
Log GDP per capita 11.063 0.004 10.812 0.002 14.551 0.000
Government Debt 0.083 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.065 0.000
Current Account 0.065 0.019 0.031 0.212 0.035 0.145
Inflation Rate 0.161 0.004 0.253 0.000 0.263 0.000
Unemployment Rate 0.180 0.003 0.255 0.000 0.246 0.000
Regulatory Quality 0.811 0.341 1.655 0.032 1.647 0.028
Competitiveness 0.037 0.002 0.031 0.005 0.040 0.000
Uncertainty 0.007 0.363 0.005 0.432 0.002 0.748
Fiscal Balance 0.021 0.649 0.020 0.618 0.031 0.437
Uncertainty > Sample Mean
Log GDP per capita 11.573 0.006 12.230 0.001 16.293 0.000
Government Debt 0.102 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.073 0.000
Current Account 0.030 0.356 0.018 0.535 0.023 0.422
Inflation Rate 0.096 0.454 0.169 0.144 0.037 0.742
Unemployment Rate 0.173 0.000 0.205 0.000 0.194 0.000
Regulatory Quality 1.749 0.014 1.614 0.013 1.568 0.012
Competitiveness 0.034 0.004 0.015 0.151 0.017 0.093
Uncertainty 0.016 0.505 0.035 0.102 0.050 0.016
Fiscal Balance 0.067 0.040 0.049 0.098 0.060 0.036
R2 0.663 0.719 0.683
AIC 7.274 7.130 7.296
F-test for equality of coefficients
Moody’s S&P’s Fitch
Log GDP per capita F(1, 218) 0.22 2.08 3.34
Prob > F 0.640 0.150 0.069
Government Debt F(1, 218) 7.43 10.27 1.75
Prob > F 0.007 0.002 0.187
Current Account F(1, 218) 0.82 2.07 3.06
Prob > F 0.366 0.152 0.082
Inflation Rate F(1, 218) 3.28 0.430 5.84
Prob > F 0.071 0.512 0.016
Unemployment Rate F(1, 218) 0.02 1.330 1.53
Prob > F 0.882 0.250 0.217
Regulatory Quality F(1, 218) 2.24 0.01 0.02
Prob > F 0.136 0.942 0.886
Competitiveness F(1, 218) 0.10 2.97 7.00
Prob > F 0.746 0.086 0.009
Uncertainty F(1, 218) 0.95 3.68 6.57
Prob > F 0.331 0.056 0.011
Fiscal Balance F(1, 218) 2.69 2.05 3.77
Prob > F 0.102 0.154 0.054
Notes: Model (7) and (8) in main text allows for the impact of all explanatory variables on credit rating decisions to change during periods of low policy
uncertainty (when uncertainty is below its sample mean) as opposed to periods of high uncertainty when uncertainty is above its sample mean). Figures in
bold indicate significance at the 10% level or lower. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion.
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